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Abstract
The rotation of identifiers is a common security mechanism to protect telecommuni-
cation; one example is the frequency hopping in wireless communication, used against
interception, radio jamming and interferences.
In this thesis, we extend this rotation concept to the Internet. We use the large
IPv6 address space to build pseudo-random sequences of IPv6 addresses, known only by
senders and receivers. The sequences are used to periodically generate new identifiers,
each of them being ephemeral. It provides a new solution to identify a flow of data,
packets not following the sequence of addresses will be rejected. We called this technique
“address spreading”.
Since the attackers cannot guess the next addresses, it is no longer possible to
inject packets. The real IPv6 addresses are obfuscated, protecting against targeted
attacks and against identification of the computer sending a flow of data. We have not
modified the routing part of IPv6 addresses, so the spreading can be easily deployed
on the Internet.
The “address spreading” needs a synchronization between devices, and it has to
take care of latency in the network. Otherwise, the identification will reject the pack-
ets (false positive detection). We evaluate this risk with a theoretical estimation of
packet loss and by running tests on the Internet. We propose a solution to provide a
synchronization between devices.
Since the address spreading cannot be deployed without cooperation of end net-
works, we propose to use ephemeral addresses. Such addresses have a lifetime limited
to the communication lifetime between two devices. The ephemeral addresses are based
on a cooperation between end devices, they add a tag to each flow of packets, and an in-
termediate device on the path of the communication, which obfuscates the real address
of data flows. The tagging is based on the Flow Label field of IPv6 packets. We propose
an evaluation of the current implementations on common operating systems. We fixed
on the Linux Kernel behaviours not following the current standards, and bugs on the
TCP stack for flow labels. We also provide new features like reading the incoming flow
labels and reflecting the flow labels on a socket.
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Introduction
The Identifiers on the Internet
The Internet is one of the most prominent technologies that has transformed modern
life. This global network, allowing instant communication everywhere in the world, has
been an important change all over the globe. Social life is impacted by the Internet, a
lot of business is conducted on the Internet, and many technologies use the Internet as
protocol for their communication.
This very important place of the Internet in our life generates more and more
constraints on its architecture. It has to be robust (an Internet failure has many social
and economical consequences), but above all secure. This security sometimes allows
to perfectly identify the owner of a communication. At the same time, recent press
articles show that there is a need to protect user’s privacy against attackers [Gre13].
The key to building security and therefore protecting the user’s privacy are iden-
tifiers used on all protocols involved in the communication. Some examples of these
identifiers are IP addresses, ports, cookies, MAC addresses, etc.
All identifiers involved in a communication are important to protect, but the chal-
lenges and the impact of doing it are not equivalent. Among them all, IP addresses
are the first to protect in building a secure Internet: they are involved in all commu-
nications on the Internet, the scope of IP addresses is global (all routers on the path
can read them), and they are mandatory for the initialization of the connection and
for the communication of data. It can be noted that a protection cannot change the
properties needed to run the network, therefore we cannot hide without the cooperation
of intermediate routers.
To understand the primary goal of the IP addresses, we have to refer to networking
theory. One element of this theory is the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model,
that is a reference to build a network. In this model, the identifiers are called Service
Access Point (SAP). A SAP is used to allow interaction between several layers. At the
network layer, the SAP is called Network Service Access Point (NSAP), identifying one
end device connected to the network.
If one end device can be identified by several NSAP, their identifiers are stable over
the connection lifetime. This stability is mandatory for the routing of data and to allow
interaction with the Transport Layer, generating a flow of data.
Our proposition
Dynamical identifiers and security
In comparison, dynamical identifiers are used for security at the physical layer. This
idea was first patented in 1942 [GK42], to protect transmission to the radio-controlled
torpedoes. The signal is changed by a piano roll, within a range of 88 frequencies. It
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makes harder for an attacker to follow the transmission, protecting against radio jam-
ming. The same idea is today the base of frequency hopping in wireless communication,
where both sender and receiver are following a temporal sequence of frequencies, in-
stead of always using the same one. It spreads over a wide range of frequencies, thus
protecting communications from interception, radio jamming and interferences.
At the application layer, some devices generate one-time-passwords, similarly with
a short validity, called tokens. They use a time synchronized algorithm with a server,
generating the same sequence of passwords/tokens. It works as long as both devices are
time synchronized, and if one attacker is not able to guess the secret used to generate
the sequence.
Dynamical network identifiers
In our work, we propose to use this idea of dynamical identifiers at the network Layer.
In other words, we shift the flow identification from a paradigm with stable NSAP, to
a paradigm with dynamical NSAP. As with frequency hopping, the receiver and the
transmitter will follow a sequence of dynamical identifiers, changing over the connection
lifetime.
Both solutions are equivalent, but not at the same layer. The frequency hopping
spreads the radio frequency spectrum, and our solution will spread the network iden-
tifiers used for a communication. In both cases, the sender and the receiver have to
agree on a sequence of identifiers, replacing the traditional static identifier. The radio
receiver will periodically switch to another frequency, and the IP node will switch to
a new listening IP address. We show in this thesis the same benefit as with the spec-
trum spreading: it avoids injection of packets (radio jamming), and protects against
identification of an IP flow by middle man. (interception). One risk with frequency
hopping and address spreading is that there could be a desynchronization of devices
and therefore, breaking the sequence of identifiers leading to packets being dropped by
the receiver.
Challenges of dynamical network identifiers
This approach is challenging, since all the Internet and the OSI model are built on
static identifiers. This stability is often taken as an assumption made by upper layers,
even when they should not be concerned with the information available at the network
layer.
On the actual Internet, an IP address is not only used for the routing of packets
but also as SAP for the Transport Layer Protocol. IP addresses are used for the
identification of a flow at the Transport Layer, and sometimes at the application layer.
Since layers are not independent, it does not follow the OSI model. A way to identify
the flow given by the sequence of IP addresses for the upper layers is needed.
Even for the last communication hop, identification remains a problem: the border
router of the network needs to follow a mapping between IP addresses and MAC ad-
dresses. A solution cannot be scalable without this mapping: a neighbor discovery for
each new address will consume a lot of resources.
Some solutions for using dynamical and ephemeral IP addresses are already avail-
able, but all of them have chosen to add complexity on the network: tunneling of real
packets inside a dynamical communication, additional headers to the packet, or flow
identification at the application layer. In our work, we propose a solution to spread
IP addresses without any additional header or information in the upper layers. Our
solution is based on IP headers only, and it works with all upper layers protocols.
xi
Our contributions
Address spreading
As previously mentioned, we propose in this thesis a new paradigm: IP addresses are
not static, but can fluctuate in time, with a high frequency of change. One device does
not use a single address, but each software instance will have a randomized address to
connect to the Internet. Thanks to the version 6 of the Internet Protocol, each device
can now use millions of addresses each day.
We propose a protocol to allow dynamical addresses with negligible drawbacks at
upper layers. We call it the address spreading, a mechanism adding security and privacy
for Internet communications. Thanks to our work, each flow of data will be based on a
sequence of IP addresses. Since an attacker cannot guess the next address to be used,
he will not be able to inject data in the flow, and will not be able to make a targeted
attack to the device. As a side effect, it protects the privacy of users, since someone
tracking the traffic will not be able to correlate a flow to a device.
Our contribution analyzes the architecture consequences of the spreading, such as
routing problems to send a packet to a real destination. We propose a protocol to
initialize a unique sequence of addresses for each data flow. Since we changed the
standard way to identify a flow, we will evaluate the risk to reject a valid packet (false
positive detection), as well as the risk of invalid packet bypassing our protection (false
negative).
Our spreading protocol and the evaluation has been published in an international
conference [FKC+14], and awarded as one of the best papers of the conference. A
shorter version with the theoretical grounds has been published in a French conference
proceeding as well [FTC+14].
From one IP per device to one IP per flow
Since spreading needs a cooperation between networks, we will complete this propo-
sition with a mechanism to obfuscate the IP address of one end device, without any
cooperation of the remote network. Our solution assigns an ephemeral IP address to
each data flow, valid only over the connection lifetime. In this work, a flow is defined to
be as granular as possible, in order to maximize the number of addresses in use without
breaking applications.
This new IP allocation scheme protects against correlation of flows, and identifica-
tion of one user from the IP address. It is a lightweight solution in comparison to full
featured anonymity systems, but it is enough to mitigate the correlation of flows and
re-identification based on the IP address. Given the place of the IP addresses in the
Internet, this protection is essential to building protection on upper layers.
While our solution provides an increase of privacy on the Internet, we do not give up
the security on the local network and our solution is compatible with a strong security
validation on the local network. It allows logging every ephemeral address, and user
identification in case of legal requirement. It provides the best of both worlds if the
local administrator can be trusted: a protection of privacy on the Internet, with good
security on the local network.
Tests and evaluation
Our theoretical work is followed by empirical tests and validations. We evaluated both
propositions thanks to our implementations, based on the Linux Operating System.
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We ran tests in laboratories, as well as on the real Internet. We prove that IP ad-
dress spreading can be done without substantial performance drawbacks, and we show
viability of the solution in several situations.
Our tests of the new method to identify a flow thanks to flow label have lead
to an evaluation of Flow Label management on several popular Operating Systems.
More specifically, our implementation and tests on the Linux Kernel have lead to a
contribution on the mainline Vanilla Linux Kernel. We complete our tests on the Flow
Label with a proposition of a library to automatically assign a Label to each process
running on the computer. Both theoretical and practical work have been published in
an international conference proceeding [FTK+13].
Structure of the manuscript
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 describes the state of the Art of flow iden-
tification on the Internet. While this flow identification is traditionally based on simple
identifiers, the constraints in some environments and the large number of usage cases
add complexity. One strength of the Internet is to allow theses cases, and to remain
compatible with other devices. After a general approach of usage on the Internet, we
explain the added value of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). Indeed, IPv6 introduces
a large address space, allowing one to add properties to the flows. We explain the use
of Cryptographically Generated Addresses, the multihoming solutions in IPv6, and the
randomization of IP addresses. We end this Chapter with the presentation of works
related to our propositions that already suggest adding some dynamics to IP addresses.
In Chapter 2 we present a new privacy solution, allowing an easy allocation of
many addresses to each device. We assign one address to each independent flow of
data, removing the linking of several flow to a single IP address. The real address
appears obfuscated for someone outside the local network, but stable inside. It allows
strong security on the local Network, and a good privacy gain on the Internet. This
solution is easy to insert into the network, and is compatible with the current Internet.
Chapter 3 describes a protocol to spread addresses of a connection, with high fre-
quency change of addresses. We describe in this chapter our theoretical work on dynam-
ical addresses. We begin with a proposition of architecture, followed by a proposition
of protocol to enable spreading. We complete it with detailed processing steps on in-
volved devices. The chapter ends with a theoretical computation of packet loss in case
of latency and time desynchronization.
Our work is fully implemented and tested. Chapter 4 describes in detail the identi-
fication of a flow thanks to IPv6 flow labels. Since no standards of the implementation
exist, we have studied the flow label management on several popular Operating Sys-
tems. We then focus our work on the Linux Kernel, with the description of the Linux
API and the changes done as part of our implementation. We conclude it with a
proposition to automatically assign a flow label to each application.
Chapter 5 describes our experimental results on address spreading. Tests on Local
Area Networks and on the Internet are presented, and compared with theoretical re-
sults. The solution has been improved thanks to overlapping temporal windows for the
lifetime of addresses. Thanks to temporal windows, we can avoid packet loss on flows
using address spreading. We conclude with a proposition to use the temporal windows
to detect desynchronization of devices. At the end, we shortly introduce tests for the
spreading benefits for a IPsec tunnel.
Chapter 6 contains the conclusion of our work, and the outlook of address spreading.
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1.1 Flow management on the Internet
The notion of flow is very important in networking technologies because it helps to
regroup packets that will be similarly processed on the network. Even if this definition
seems obvious, it has been subject to many debate during the past years. A flow
can be explicit as in the old telephony network where wires were connected together
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to allow a user to talk to another one. It has been virtualized since with the use of
virtual circuit, and the use of datagram networks. Indeed, a flow can be implicit as
in the IP network where packets belonging to the same flow can follow different paths
in the network. In that case, the flow is only known by the sender and the receiver.
Intermediary elements, or routers, process each piece of information individually, that
is the definition of datagram.
As nothing in a packet can directly indicate a flow, in the IP world upper layer
protocols are needed to read information and explicit a flow. Fortunately, the notion
of flow is more natural at the transport layer. This is a mandatory function to sort
packets, reassemble segments and detect errors, like the popular Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) [Pos81b] protocol does. To have this notion of flow, Transport Layer
addresses are used, named ports in case of TCP. On each computer, one port is mapped
to only one application, and ports are used to discriminate flows. Nevertheless, since
the same port number can be used on several computers, the source and destination
ports are not enough to characterize the flow. The source’s and destination’s IP address
are needed: IP addresses are unique by nature on the Internet, and they can be used
as identifiers for the flow.
This is why a tuple of five elements is needed in order to extract the notion of flow
on the network. The first two are the source’s and destination’s IP addresses, directly
available in IP headers. The next one is the transport layer number. With the transport
layer number, the structure of the transport header is know and can be parsed. The
transport addresses can be read, and they complete the tuple, already filled with the
three identifiers of IP header.
This has some consequences on the Internet structure. IP addresses are not only
used in the routing process, but are also part of identifiers of a flow.
1.2 Consequences of using IP addresses identifiers
This duality of an IP address between a locator (“where”) and an identifier (“who”) is
probably one explanation of the big success of the IP protocol. Indeed, it makes the
network easy to understand, easy to deploy, easy to debug and to scale. There is one
uniqueness of IP address by design, and the interconnection is very easy, thanks to the
original hierarchical address space. In comparison, IPX of Novell was widely deployed
and had many additional features, like the auto-configuration, but the complexity to
interconnect networks was too high.
The drawback of this IP address duality is the lack of some features. Mobility in
the IP network is hard to provide, a device moving across several networks cannot use
a stable identifier. A device moving across several networks will get a new IP address,
breaking all established connections. One IP address does not provide any ownership
feature. A computer will receive a flow of packets because of its right place of the
network according to the routing rules, not because of its identity.
1.3 Flow transformations: identifiers for special cases
Because of the Internet complex topology and the variety of devices, the standard
features of the IP protocol may in some cases not be enough. The additional features are
then added by a flow transformation, that manipulate headers on the communication
path. In this case, the standard flow identification is often not enough.
The most popular transformation is currently the sharing of IP address, allowing
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several devices to be seen as only a single the Internet. The standard Internet topology
does not allow this sharing, and an insertion of a device is needed, providing a mapping
between some external identifiers to internal identifiers. An external observer is not
aware of the internal topology behind the device.
This mapping on the outgoing traffic (to the Internet) can be described as a func-
tion F , that takes some local identifiers available in the packet header as argument and
gives as a result new identifiers used on the Internet. F−1 is the inverse function to
convert incoming traffic to the flow expected by the local device.
The are two strategies to build F : adding new headers in the packet, or rewriting
available identifiers. The first one has an important drawback: the size of a packet max-
imum size, and adding an extra header can exceed this maximum. The consequences
and the risks to exceed the packet maximum size are summarized in the RFC 4459
[Sav06]. In any case, these identifiers increase the amount of headers, reducing the
network performance for data transfer.
The second strategy is the most deployed. In this case, the simplest function F will
take as argument the standard tuple of five elements, composed of:
• IPsrc the local address used by the connected devices;
• IPdst the destination address;
• portsrc the source port of the transport layer;
• portdst the destination port of the transport layer;
• protocol the identifier of the protocol layer.
It returns a new tuple, used on the Internet. The function F can be split in five
sub-functions:
F (tuple) = fIPsrc(tuple), fIPdst(tuple), fportSRC(tuple), fportDST (tuple), fprotocol(tuple)
Since protocol cannot be changed without many consequences (functionalities of
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and TCP are not the same, for example), the partial
function fprotocol is always the identity function. A translation from one transport layer
protocol to another does not exist.
addressdst and portdst cannot be changed without consequences on the destination
device. This is why fIPdst and fportDST are very often the identity function too. The
two local values, addresssrc and portsrc, can be locally overwritten, and are the more
popular way to change the tuple.
It is important to notice that F has to be a one-to-one mapping function, i.e.
a bijective function. Without this mapping, two internal flows will share the same
external flow and probably break one (or both) connections. In the same way, F has to
map every external flow to one local flow. This mapping assure the existence of F−1,
bijective too. Bijectivity of F is equivalent to say that for each local valid tuple, there
is exactly one global tuple sent on the Internet.
1.3.1 Private addresses and the renumbering problem
A local network needs to use IP addresses to reach and to be reachable on the Internet.
Administratively, there are two ways to have the right to use IP addresses. The first
group is the Provider-Independent (PI) Addresses, an independent block of addresses.
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The route to a block of PI addresses can be announced by any Internet Provider,
without constraint of location. One advantage is the simplicity to change to another
Internet Service Provider (ISP). All the IP addresses are stable, the network “owns”
the IP addresses. The main issue of this approach is its scalability: if each local
network “owns” one IP address and announce it on the Internet, the routing table will
be extremely large.
The second group is the Provider-Assigned (PA) addresses. A PA block of addresses
is assigned by one ISP to a local network. It is the standard for residential networks
and for small companies. It introduces a dependency to the ISP: the ISP owns the
addresses. If the client wants to change the ISP, he/she has to reconfigure all devices
using the addresses. The location of a PA block is restricted: it has to be connected to
the upstream ISP. The IP address, used as identifier, is in this case a locator too. The
PA blocks reduce the pressure on the routing table, since all addresses of one ISP can
be aggregated in one route.
This problem is called the “renumbering problem”. A network is configured with
an address prefix, but if it changes, the configuration has to be renewed. To simplify
the work of the network administrator, one idea is to use private addresses on the local
network, and to convert these private addresses to public addresses at the border of the
network. In this way, the local network is stable, and only the border router needs a new
configuration in case of new prefix. This idea is normalized in the RFC 1918 [RMK+96].
There are two difficulties of using private addresses. The first obvious one is rewrit-
ing of addresses between the local network and the Internet. One of the possible
solutions is the Network Address Translation (NAT), described in Section 1.3.4. The
second problem is the connectivity between several private networks. If two companies
want to share there private networks1, thanks to a Virtual Private Network (VPN),
they have to be sure that they do not use the same IP address space. Reconfiguration
is required in case of conflict.
1.3.2 Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol
The report from the IAB Workshop on Routing and Addressing, published in RFC 4984
[MZF07], concludes with a call to break the link between Identifier and Locator in the
IP address semantic. One well known solution to do it is the Locator/ID Separation
Protocol (LISP) [FFML13], providing a new way to identify computers. With this
solution, a computer is identified by a unique identifier, used by end devices. The core
of the network contains a mapping between this identifier and one or several locators,
and the original packet is routed inside a tunnel (the original packet is encapsulated by
a LISP router aware).
While LISP is a solution to solve the growth of the routing table and to remove
the identification role of one IP address, it adds some complexity. The most important
issue is to provide a mapping between one identifier and one locator. The choice made
by LISP for the function F is to add extra headers, encapsulating the real packet. It
changes the Max Transport Unit (MTU) of the transmission, and it implies to add a
lot of intelligence in the network. Another LISP router will be in charge to encapsulate
and decapsulate packets with the reverse function F−1. Since the mapping of F is done
by several independent devices, the mapping between identifier and locators has to be
unique.
LISP has been deployed on several networks, and a RFC on deployment considera-
tion is already available [JCAC+14]. However, it is too early to guess about the success
1Often needed if a company buys a second one.
1.3. FLOW TRANSFOMATIONS 5
of LISP.
1.3.3 Host Identity Protocol
An alternative to LISP is Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [MNJH08], providing a proof of
a host identity thanks to a public/private key pair. The architecture of HIP is not the
same as LISP: LISP is based on an upgrade of routers in the core of the Internet, while
end devices do not need to be upgraded and can remain unaware of the change. With
HIP, the authentication and the cryptographic computation is done on end devices.
One strong point of HIP is its support of mobility: the IP address used in the
communication (as a locator only, the cryptographic keys are the identifiers) can be
updated without loss of connectivity. Since only end devices are involved, they are
aware of the function F adding extra headers, and the MTU problem is less an issue.
As LISP, HIP is an experimental protocol and no big deployments are expected
before years.
1.3.4 IP address exhaustion and the NAT
The Internet grows at a tremendous pace and connects today a larger number of than
excepted at the beginning. Since addresses are encoded in a defined size, the initial
underestimation causes an important issue: the number of devices is larger than the
number of Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) addresses. In other words, the IPv4
address space is too small. One workaround found by the Internet community is to
deploy many private addresses, and to convert them at the border of the network to a
public address.
Time sharing of an IP address
The trivial way of doing it is documented in the RFC 1631 [EF94], published in 1994.
It allows rewriting of an IP address (non-routable on the Internet) to another (routable
on the Internet). The main idea was that all computers of a network do not need to
simultaneously access to the Internet. It works as long as two computers of the same
local network does not need an Internet access at the same time.
It is simple, since it only requires a one-to-one mapping of the source address, thus
the function F is easily defined. However, first problems were already identified, like
compatibility with File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [Het07], an application layer protocol
to send and receive files. FTP sends the IP address in some communication messages
and this address is not rewritten by the NAT, since it does not care of the application
layer. Additionally, the translator has to deal with the checksum, invalidated by the
address rewriting.
The popular NATP solution
Restricting the access to the Internet to a single computer is of course not realistic in
modern networks. Many devices are connected to local networks, and they all need a
good connectivity to the Internet at the same time. The NAT idea was extended, and
has today more features. The IP address sharing works with simultaneously connected
computers, and a big NAT can share one public IP address for several thousand devices
with private addresses. This is done with Network Address Port Translation (NATP).
The partial function fIPsrc of F is not enough to assure the one-to-one mapping,
because local computers do not share information and can open two communications
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ipv4 udp src=192.168.0.120 dst=203.0.113.2 sport=1708 dport=123
src=203.0.113.2 dst=203.0.113.1 sport=123 dport=1708
ipv4 tcp ESTABLISHED src=192.168.0.118 dst=203.0.113.3 sport=2579 dport=443
src=203.0.113.3 dst=203.0.113.1 sport=443 dport=2579
ipv4 tcp ESTABLISHED src=192.168.0.141 dst=203.0.113.36 sport=6654 dport=13
src=203.0.113.36 dst=203.0.113.1 sport=13 dport=6654
Figure 1.1: Excerpt of a NAT table (conntrack) on a Linux router. 192.168.0.0/24 is
the local network, 203.0.113.1 the public IP address
simultaneously with same four tuple addressdst, portsrc, portdst and protocol. This is
why the router uses information from the transport layer (TCP, UDP) to rewrite the
port source with the partial function fportSRC , to assure the one-to-one mapping of F .
Note that the acronym NAT is used for NATP in current communications. It is
though badly named because it does not only rewrite the IP addresses but also the
identifiers of the transport layer. RFC 2663 [SH99] tried to define NAT types, and the
terminology to speak about this technology.
To assure the mapping of received packets, the five tuple source (input of F ) and the
modified tuple (output of F ) are stored on the router (see Figure 1.3.4 for an example),
which has to maintain a state for all connections. This storage provides means to
rewrite incoming packets with the inverse function F−1 to deliver packets to the correct
local computer. Note that without explicit configuration, all incoming packets without
correspondence in the NAT context will be dropped. A local computer cannot be
directly contacted by an external device, only outgoing connection establishment is
allowed.
Consequences of NATP
This stateful function has a cost for router complexity, they need to have enough
memory and computational capacity to manage flows. For each received packet, the
router has to look for a valid context and to rewrite headers, including those computed
like the checksum used to detect transmission errors.
It does however not only have drawback for hardware performance, but also adds
complexity to the architecture of the Internet [Hai00] and applications (see [HS01],
[FBD+11] and [SFK08]). For the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the consen-
sus was always that NAT is a bad idea. To mitigate problems, a lot of work has been
done, like adaptation of Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), solution to NAT traversal
like Simple Traversal of UDP through NATs (STUN) [RWHM03]. Even if the NAT
process was never standardized2, two RFCs described best current practices for UDP
[AJ07] and TCP [GBF+08] nating. Note that the publication of best practices was
done in 2007 and 2008, more than five years after the publication of problems and
implications of NAT.
2The NATP was described in RFC 3022 [SE01], an extension of RFC 1631. It is however only an
informational RFC.
1.3. FLOW TRANSFOMATIONS 7
“Address + Port” translation
The NATP was traditionally done at the border of a home network: for each subscrip-
tion to an Internet connection, the customer receives a public IP address. Since the
exhaustion of IPv4 addresses is every day more real, one IP address per customer is not
possible anymore for some providers. To increase the number of users sharing one IP
address, they move the NAT device inside the network of the operator. This technology
is called Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN).
Since the NAT is is no longer controlled by the subscriber, and since the CGN adds
a new NAT on the communication path and does not replace the first one, the issues
are even worse than for a standard NATP. A packet will be mapped at home with a first
NAT with a F1 function, and second by the ISP with a function F2. It has implication
both for the network applications [DHK+13], and for the management of private IP
addresses [SF10].
An intermediate solution to give some control of public IP addresses to customers
is to “divide” IP addresses by ports. In this solution, named “Address + Port” [Bus11],
the port number of TCP and UDP are used as identifiers for the packet routing. This
“extended addressing” remove the need of a second NAT for the ISP. The solution still
requires a device for mapping ports and customers, but packets are not modified.
For the customer, the function F appears a standard NAT function, except that
the output of the partial function fportDST (tuple) is bounded to a range of the 65535
ports. To keep the bijectivity of F , the range has to be large enough [FGK+12]. In
case of exhaustion of available ports, no new connection can be opened.
1.3.5 Multihoming
A network is called multihomed when it is connected to more than one ISP, or to
several link layers of one ISP. A multihomed network has several paths to connect
to the Internet, which increases the complexity of the network. It has however many
benefits, and the first of them is reliability. If a link of an ISP goes down, the network
can still reach the Internet thanks to the second provider.
Variant of the renumbering problem
If the network is large enough to have a PI’s address space, the local network uses
these addresses to manage the network and only organizes the transit with upstream
ISP. The second advantage is that the network can change ISP without changing IP
addresses configured on the network.
For a small multihomed network, each ISP delegates a prefix of addresses3. This
prefix is only reachable via this ISP, and if the link goes down, the prefix can no longer
be used. All flows using these addresses are broken, as long as the link is down, and
no new flow can be established with the addresses.
To mitigate this problem, one solution is to avoid the addresses allocated by the
ISP on the local network, and to use private addresses. Rewriting at the border of the
network is required, using NAT for example. If the link goes down, it still breaks all the
established connections (using the unreachable address as identifier), but all new con-
nections will not use the unreachable link, if the router is aware of the malfunctioning.
This fallback works without changing the configuration of end devices.
3This prefix can be limited to only one address.
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Increasing performances with Transport layer solutions
If a network is multihomed, a natural idea is to use all links for performance and
resilience improvement, instead of only one. A flow could even use several paths, and
use all the available bandwidth.
If a network owns a PI address space, routing capabilities provide means to optimize
load balancing and capacity of all links. It does not change the flow identification.
If the network has no PI addresses but several Internet accesses with several prefixes,
a flow has to be built with several source IP addresses. As for a flow with only one IP
address, it cannot be done with only identifiers of the IP layer and compatible transport
layer protocols are needed. We introduce two of them here.
The first one is a complete new transport protocol, Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP) [Ste07]. In comparison with TCP and UDP, this is a rather young
protocol, as the RFC was published in 2007. The motivation was to bypass limitations
of TCP, and to take benefit from accumulated experience to provide a modern protocol
adapted to the current Internet. SCTP supports more than one available address, and
allows switching to another address in case of failure. All addresses are exchanged by
the peers at the connection initialization. With SCTP, the source and the destination
have to use a function F to convert all combinations of IPsrc and IPdst to only one
connection.
The second protocol is even younger, and is an extension of TCP called Multipath
TCP (MPTCP) [FRH+11]. It allows a TCP connection to use all the available band-
width, and is designed to improve performances. It has an experimental status at the
IETF as explained in the RFC 6824 [FRHB13]. With MPTCP, two devices will be
able to generate and add subflows to the main one. In this case, a function F is needed
to group all subflows with the main one. The mapping is provided by a new option in
TCP headers.
1.4 Security and privacy consequences of flow transfor-
mations
The identification of a flow is the base of security: it provides means to identify the
sender of packets, in order to filter legitimate traffic and dangerous traffic. On the
other side, the protection of identifiers is an important feature to provide privacy on
the Internet. Indeed, identifiers can be used to identify a user, correlate traffic, etc.
1.4.1 Security of flow transformations
Since a flow transformation changes the classical identifiers, it adds a new security risk:
how secure is this new or modified identifier? How to do the mapping between the
identifiers before and after the transformation? The function F has to be secure, to
map only the legitimate packets from some identifiers to new identifiers. The mapping
is insecure if someone is able to inject traffic in a valid flow transformed by the F
function, without providing valid identifiers for the transformation.
This mapping is obviously essential in real time to provide connectivity. Further-
more, the mapping has often to be logged in case of legal requirement. Only the classical
tuple available after the transformation is usually logged by destination servers. in case
of legal requirement, the administrator has to provide the mapping used by the function
F at all times.
1.4. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONSEQUENCES 9
1.4.2 Do not broadcast identifiers to protect privacy
If the protection of identifiers is a goal of all privacy technologies, Internet flows have a
specific issue: a flow will broadcast identifiers to the Internet. A card ID is an identifier,
but is not broadcast everywhere.
To protect privacy, a solution is to avoid static identifiers, and to replace them with
shared pseudo-random sequences [Nik07], or random values, or to reduce the value of
the identifiers (making harder the mapping between one identifier and one identity).
Sharing the same address
The first naive solution to reduce the value of one identifier is to share this identifier
with other people. If the group of people is large enough, it hardens the identification
of the real flow owner.
From this point of view, NAT is a kind of privacy feature. It rewrites the unique
identifiers to only one IP address, and all users behind the NAT cannot be identified
with the IP address.
Random address
As already said, one IP address is not a standard identifier and it cannot be randomized
without connectivity issue. The locator semantic, or the routing part of the address,
cannot be changed. However, the last part of an IP address is only used to identify end
devices on a local network, and does not change routing.
To protect users, one solution is to use ephemeral addresses, with a rotation of the
second address part. Of course, the risk of collision in the address generation has to be
considered, but it is a standard solution for networks with enough addresses [NDK07].
Privacy protection offered by multihoming
Multihoming allows several paths to send communications, a multihomed device can
split a flow in several paths. If a malicious observer is known to be at one path, but
not on all of them, sending data across protected paths protects the communication.
Since it is often not possible to know where attackers are, a good idea is to split the
communication onto all paths. An attacker must control all of them, if he wants a full
observation of exchanged data.
To accomplish that, the first way to protect relies on using several connections to
spread data [SSH05]. It protects privacy, as long as an observer cannot read all the
traffic and correlate addresses to one specific end device. The MPTCP can be used for
it as well.
However, if the attacker can observe all the paths of the communication, the stan-
dard multihoming protocols do not add any privacy benefit. The SCTP and MPTCP do
not protect against eavesdroppers to make correlation between flows and do not mask
the identity of the computer. They both add a new identifier, allowing one attacker to
follow the flow of data.
A second protection can be done thanks to multihoming protocols: switching to
new addresses and using simultaneously more than one address are in the basis of the
multihoming concept. This can be used4 to build privacy solutions, based on ephemeral
addresses. Since it needs many available addresses to be deployed, it is not realistic on
the restricted IPv4 address space. Nevertheless, it is with the IPv6 one.
4Directly or with small protocol modifications.
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1.5 New flow properties offered by IPv6
IPv4 and IPv6 are two versions of the same protocol, they share the same interconnec-
tion goal and the same bases. However, IPv6 adds some improvement and opportunities
to develop new features on the Internet. In this section, we first describe the important
new features of IPv6 for the identification of flows. Afterwards, we explain the change
involved by IPv6.
1.5.1 New IPv6 features
A large address space
In the early designed and still in use IPv4 world, the address values are stored in short
words. Addresses are encoded using 32 bits, and up to 4 294 967 296 addresses may be
allocated. There is no longer enough addresses for all Internet devices. Because of this
shortage, some computers do not even have a public IP address. In many situations,
devices are configured only with private IP addresses and have to share the public
address with other devices through a NAT system. Due to this lack of addresses, it
was not possible to make some variations of identifiers, even if connectivity problems
were solved. With IPv6 and the very large address space of 128 bits5, it is now possible
to consider using more than one address per device and randomization of addresses
becomes a relevant research topic.
Separation between routing part and interface identifier
Another important change happened with IPv6 addresses partitions. As for the IPv4
[Pos81a], IP addresses are divided into two parts. The first one contains routing infor-
mation, called “network number” in IPv4. The second one is the local address, or “rest
field”. The size of the rest field was actually very limited because of IPv4 address space
exhaustion. The idea of separation into two parts still holds in IPv6, as described in
RFC 3587 [HDN03]. There are two distinct parts: the routing information (the global
routing prefix and the subnet ID) and the Interface Identifier, as show in Figure 1.2.
While the first part is read by routers, the Interface Identifier is not used in the Inter-
net core network and can be locally changed without routing implications across the
Internet. The classical size of Interface Identifier is 64 bits, it can be assumed to be a
minimum for typical networks6. The size of IPv6 addresses, and more specifically the
size of the Interface Identifier, allows many new features to identify or to transform a
flow.
Auto-configuration of IPv6 nodes
The IPv6 Interface Identifier is not only large, it can also be auto-configured by nodes.
On many IPv4 networks, the lack of available addresses led to the need of a stateful
solution to allocate node addresses. With IPv6, the risk of collision is very low, and the
risk of address exhaustion on the network is null. The management can be stateless.
In a stateless configuration, each node generates itself an Interface Identifier. The
first standardized method is to derivate an address MAC to an Identifier, called EUI-64
format [HD06]. This generation raises a privacy issue: the interface identifier remains
always the same, even if the network changes. It allows the tracing of a device position.
5With 128 bits: 2128 = 340282366920938463463374607431768211456 addresses, more than 3.4∗1038.
6We discuss the real size of IPv6 prefixes in the Appendix A.1.
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+-------------------------+-----------+----------------------------+
| global routing prefix | subnet ID | interface ID |
+-------------------------+-----------+----------------------------+
| N bits | 64-N bits | 64 bits |
+-------------------------+-----------+----------------------------+
| 2A01:0240:FE55 | 0001 | 021E:33FF:FE3B:5A94 |
+-------------------------+-----------+----------------------------+
Figure 1.2: Structure of a IPv6 address and real example
To prevent this issue, the generation can be extended by ephemeral addresses
[NDK07]. Another solution is to replace the EUI-64 addresses by static addresses,
but generated for each network [Gon14].
When addresses have to be managed, the DHCPv6 protocol [DBV+03] can pro-
vide a stateful solution. It takes the advantage of the IPv6 large space, allowing the
distribution of temporary addresses (TA) to protect user privacy.
Flow labels
IPv6 introduces a new IP header field: the flow label value. IPv4 does not have
equivalent header. This new header is the consequence of another change: the format
of IPv6 extensions is not fixed. There is no standard access to the size of an extension,
and it is not possible to only read first octets and go then to the next one. For accessing
to transport headers, all extensions have to be parsed one by one. The problem has
been identified and recently fixed in RFC 6564 [KWK+12], but the solution only works
for future extensions, not for those already in use. This is why transport protocol
identifiers like TCP and UDP ports, can be hard to get and, as a consequence, flows
hard to identify. As performing identification without complex parsing makes sense,
the IETF introduces the “flow label” in IPv6 headers for it. The flow label field is
described in RFC 3697 [RCCD04], and updated by RFC 6437 [ACJR11]. The flow
label is a new alternative and easier solution to manage and identify network flows,
directly at the network layer.
1.5.2 Local Network Protection
The IPv6 technology not only changed in IP packet headers, but also included new
schemes and new protocols. Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) of IPv6 pro-
tocol has many new features, the auto-configuration is a new scheme for address allo-
cation, etc. IPv6 changed the standard configuration of IP network, and added a new
solution for flow transformations. While flow transformations in IPv4 relied on the
NAT, IPv6 solves many issues.
RFC 4864, named “Local Network Protection for IPv6” [dVHD+07], summarizes
new schemes provided by IPv6, and the equivalent technology in IPv4. Indeed, the
NAT has some properties for security, local usage tracking, privacy, renumbering and
multihoming, and more.
In the particular case of multihoming, IPv6 is by design built to support several
IP addresses on each end devices. While the NAT was used to provide a low cost
multi-homing, a network can now easily broadcast several routers to configure several
communication paths to each end device.
12 CHAPTER 1. STATE OF THE ART
1.5.3 Cryptographic protection of addresses
Since IP addresses are used as identifiers for computers, proving the ownership of an
address can be important. This is the goal of Cryptographically Generated Addresses
(CGA), defined in RFC 3972 [Aur05]. CGA IPv6 addresses are defined as an interface
identifier generated by a cryptographic hash function. Inputs of the hash function are
public and one of them is a public cryptographic key. It is then possible to check
whereas public given parameters are consistent with a given identifier. Since the public
key is sent with the packet to protect, no external Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is
needed. The goal of the protection here is to prevent spoofing attacks: an attacker
cannot claim to be the owner of an IP address.
Without PKI, the CGA protection works like a pseudonym. A connected device
chooses a pseudonym (a couple of private/public key) and sends a proof that all packets
sent from one address are not spoofed by someone else. To provide a real owner proof
without pseudonym, the administrator still has to deploy a PKI and to self deploy the
couple of private/public keys on all connected devices.
CGA generation
A CGA is only meaningful with the associated generating parameters. CGA generation
needs three inputs:
• a subnet prefix of the device (8 octets);
• a cryptographic public key (variable size);
• a security parameter (Sec) (described below).
The complete generation process is described in section 4 of RFC 3972. In short,
the generation works the following way:
1. Generate a random 128-bit value, named “modifier value”;
2. Concatenate the modifier, 9 zero octets and the public key. Execute a hash
function on the concatenation. The 112 leftmost bits of the hash are named
Hash2;
3. Check that the left 16 ∗ Sec leftmost bits of Hash2 is equal to zero. If not, incre-
ment the modifier and go back to step 2 (these first three steps are represented
in Figure 1.3);
4. Concatenate the final modifier value, the subnet prefix and the encoded public
key. Execute a hash function on the concatenation. The result is Hash1. The
three leftmost bits of Hash1 are replaced by the Sec value and the result is set as
the interface identifier (see Figure 1.4);
5. Assign the new IP (Prefix + interface identifier) to the interface;
6. Form the CGA parameters data structure by concatenating the final modifier
value, the subnet prefix, and the encoded public key.
Though there are 9 steps defined in the RFC. All parameters have to be public
in order to perform a CGA verification. Additionally, the real algorithm performs
duplicate address detection and sets the Universal/Local and Individual/Group bits of
IPv6 address to zero.
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Figure 1.3: Algorithm to find a Hash2 consistent with Sec value (steps 1-3)
Figure 1.4: Algorithm to generate interface identifier (step 4)
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The hash function is defined in RFC 3972 as SHA-1 function [rJ01], but according
to RFC 4982 [BA07] it is now possible to use multiple hash algorithms, and not only
SHA-1.
Security parameter of CGA
The security level (Sec) can be configured between 0 and 7, in order to make brute-
force attacks more difficult. The goal of an attacker is to generate the same interface
identifier with another public key and valid CGA parameters. The security parameter
is encoded as an unsigned 3-bit integer which is part of the interface identifier (first 3
bits). To generate a valid CGA with Sec parameter, Hash2 has to be computed (see
below) with the leftmost 16 ∗ Sec bits set to zero. Note that increasing the difficulty
of a brute force attacking, also means increasing the difficulty to generate valid CGA
parameters. The cost for generating a valid CGA address follows a factor of 216∗Sec
computations. With current computers, it takes on average half an hour to generate a
CGA with Sec = 2, several years with Sec = 3 and higher values are not computable.
For an attacher (without PKI deployed on the network), the goal is to find a valid
pair of public/private keys that matches the interface identifier value (59 bits are free
in CGA, since Sec value is encoded in 3 bits and two bits are reserved in IPv6 interface
identifiers) and also the Hash2 value with 16 ∗ Sec zeros at the end. It means that the
complexity for an attack is O(259+16∗Sec) computations, theoretically not computable
today.
One of the CGA limitation is the non-predictable generation time. The algorithm
is not deterministic and not guaranteed to find a Hash2 with enough zeros. It is only
possible to calculate an average generation time. Ahmad Alsa’deh, Hosnieh Rafiee and
Christoph Meinel propose [ARM12] to reduce the granularity of Sec parameters from
16 to 8 (since higher values are not computable), and to let the user configure the time
of the hash generation, instead of the security parameters. At the end of the generation
time, the algorithm takes the hash which corresponds to the best Sec value.
Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol
A CGA provides a binding between a cryptographic public key and an IPv6 address.
It is though not enough to provide spoofing protection, since all CGA parameters are
public. The Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol [AKZN05] adds a signature to
the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP), generated with the private key. A fundamental
property of asymmetric cryptography is that private keys cannot be calculated from
public keys without a very high effort, impossible to achieve with modern computers.
A cryptographic signature is then enough to proof the identity of the sender.
With SEND, the local network is protected against spoofing attacks. It is though
a first hop security. Outside the local network, a CGA address looks like a randomly
generated address (public key and other parameters are not broadcasted).
SEND is the main protocol taking advantage of CGA addresses, but the benefit of
linkability between IP addresses and identity is only available on local area network. It
does not protect against external address spoofing (an attacker pretending to be part
of the network to a third party server), and other solutions like IPsec have to be used
to provide real remote identification and authentication on the network layer.
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Figure 1.5: Shim6 connection: all routes are available
Figure 1.6: Shim6 connection: fallback on another route
Conclusion on CGA
CGA allows in coordination with SEND to prove of the sender’s identity. This feature
is useful against spoofing on a local network. The drawbacks are the computational
cost to generate addresses, and the possibility that a CGA with a high Sec cannot
be regenerated and will be used as a permanent address, in the same way as auto-
configured addresses. This stability implies the same consequence for privacy, and the
same security problems that auto-configured addresses.
1.5.4 Site Multihoming by IPv6 Intermediation
Site Multihoming by IPv6 Intermediation (Shim6) is a protocol which provides effi-
cient failover in multihoming environment, for IPv6 flows only. It is longly defined in
RFC 5533 [NB09], and is on standard tracks. The Shim6 protocol finds its place be-
tween the IPv6 protocol and transport layers. It provides compatibility with all upper
protocols layers. Since the IPv6 layer is not modified, the protocol does not need the
upgrade of routers to work.
Nevertheless, location between network and transport layers is not the only partic-
ularity of Shim6. It can also be activated anytime in the connection lifetime, and not
only at the initialization. After the activation of a Shim6 context (both computers ex-
change available addresses), packets are not modified as long as the current link works.
The Figure 1.5 depicts an initialized Shim6 connection .
Additional headers are only introduced in case of failures (failure detection is spec-
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ified in the RFC 5334 [AvB09]). This header contains a Context Tag (CT) to allow
the mapping to the old address. As shown in Figure 1.6, the connection falls back to
another route in case of failure. Note that Shim6 is not a load balancing solution, inter-
faces are never simultaneously in use. The Shim6 header is added as an IPv6 extension
header.
The security provided by Shim6 is very interesting in our context because it can
use Hash Based Addresses (HBA) [Bag09], a variant of CGA. HBA provides a security
link between an address pool and a host, useful to provide protection against communi-
cation hijacking. HBA uses the large IPv6 address space to include information about
available prefixes in the address itself. CGA and HBA are compatible and can be used
simultaneously for the same address.
In conclusion, the five element tuple is completed with a new identifier. Rewriting
of addresses via fIPsrc and fIPdst is done on end devices and after the checksum verifi-
cation of the transport layer. It can be considered as an extension of the classical flow
identification paradigm.
1.5.5 Encoding more information in addresses
New identifiers encoded in addresses
Even though several IP addresses can be allocated to a computer, it often happens
that only one IP address is used for all software on a computer. All users, all software,
can send data using one assigned address. It might be complex to change this policy
(but possible, the Linux Netfilter allows to set a firewall policy for each user) and
only possible on the local computer. It is nevertheless not possible for a network
administrator to deploy filtering policies against connected users on a computer, or
against a special application. Not enough information are available at the network
layer.
Some contributions propose to change this paradigm. The first one is to improve
firewall rules [GB01]. Each application would use a single address with encoded infor-
mation about the ports to open. To provide address uniqueness, the port to open would
be encoded in the “free” part of the auto-configuration of EUI64 [HD06], standardly
fixed for all bits to 1. The authors consider that there is no risk of duplicate address
and they have not perform Duplicate Address Detection on the local network. Some
modifications of applications and operating systems have to be done, and they discuss
Domain Name System (DNS) interoperation too.
The second idea is to assign one address to each user [PTCB+09]. In the proposal,
the user ID is encoded in the “free” part of EUI64 too, and the operating system is in
charge of the address assignment. With this solution, it is possible to efficiently restrict
traffic of not authorized users, and to build a complex access control [Pre10].
Addresses as a container for raw data
The idea of data encoding in interface identifier can be extended to provide a side
channel [Lin07], especially if randomly generated addresses are allowed on the network.
Indeed, how to be sure that the random address is really random and does not include
information on the address itself?
1.5.6 Solving the renumbering problem thanks to NPTv6
If multihoming is by design in IPv6, the renumbering problem is still not really solved.
If a network receives a new prefix of addresses, it breaks the internal connectivity
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between computers, and the configuration of services has to be updated. For example,
the addresses publicly announced in the DNS are obsolete. In such case, rewriting from
private addresses to public addresses can still be a solution.
In such cases, IPv6 allows an elegant solution. RFC 6296 [WB11] proposes to
rewrite internal addresses to external addresses with a specified arithmetical scheme.
Thanks to the large IPv6 address space, this scheme is able to compute a new address
without any change in the checksum of the packet. It spares a lot of resources, the
device in charge of rewriting does not have to parse the packet to get the checksum
and to modify it.
While this solution has better performances than standard NAT, some issues still
remains: for example rewriting will invalidate all cryptographic protection on the packet
(IPsec, TCP signatures, etc). Moreover, the end-to-end connectivity for protocols
sending the IP addresses in use in the payload of the IP packet is broken.
1.6 Clock based flow identification
We described in previous sections some ways to identify, and to transform flows. All
the transformations are done in a static way: some identifiers of a flow are added or
modified, but the identifiers are static over the lifetime of the connection. It is not
surprising, since all the Internet is built on static identifiers.
For example, an address with a randomized interface identifier will be used for all
TCP connections established by the device over the address lifetime. If the computer
changes the address, all established TCP connections would break. The randomized
interface identifier does not allow a fast rotation of addresses.
However, some works provides dynamical identifiers, or something close to it. The
goal is them to provide a function F taking as argument the time t, in addition to
traditional identifiers. The receiver of the flow can then rebuild a static flow with the
inverse function F−1, taking the time as argument as well.
We describe some of them in this section.
1.6.1 Shim6 extension for privacy improvements
Since Shim6 can use more than one address for a connection, it can be used for privacy
improvements. This is the idea of Marcelo Bagnulo, Alberto Garcia-Martinez, Arturo
Azcorra in [BGMA07]. They do not use Shim6 to maintain a connection after a failure,
but to jump from one address to another periodically. By design, Shim6 is multihoming
compatible, and flow packets can be split between several Internet providers.
To obfuscate the Shim6 identifiers, they propose Diffie-Hellman key generation in
the negotiation of Shim6 context. This key is optionally used to generate a pseudo-
random sequence of Context Tag (CT). In this mode, the CT is no more stable (stability
provides a way for an eavesdropper to identify flows), a sequence is computed at the
beginning of the communication.
One problem of the solution is the address pre-reservation. Before the Shim6 estab-
lishment, a node has to assign each address to the interface and to perform Duplicate
Address Detection. It can raise problems for a long communication with many ad-
dresses.
Privacy improvement is not the only way to use Shim6 for unintended proposes. Xi-
angbin Cheng, Jun Bi, and Xing Li propose in [CBL08] a protection against Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS). The idea is that the attacked server switches all established
connections to an alternative address. The main address is shaped and controlled to
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give an acceptable flow to the main server. It does not provide protection for new
clients, they still have difficulties to contact the service, but all established connections
are safe.
Note that both solutions based on Shim6 have a performance overhead due to the
new headers, and that the identifiers are not really dynamical. At the initialization,
many identifiers are reserved. It avoids collisions (the same identifier value is used
for two or more connections), but it does not take all the advantage of dynamical
identifiers. At the end of the pre-computed sequence, the communication has to use
static identifiers or to be fully reinitialized.
1.6.2 Address hopping thanks to the application layer
In case of DDoS attacks, it is important to discriminate legitimate users from attack-
ers. One solution to mitigate attacks is to change periodically network identifiers (IP
addresses) to provide some obfuscations. A legitimate user will have the current valid
address and an attacker will send traffic using an old address. It is then easy to filter
traffic on an upstream router and to prevent attacks. Whereas the network layer is not
efficient to discriminate “legitimate” users and cannot send new network identifiers in
case of change, the application layer has more possibilities.
The Prateek Mittal proposition [MKHC11] is to periodically hop addresses, to in-
crease the difficulty of an attack against a host. Since addresses cannot be distributed
by DNS (for two reasons: first, the DNS architecture is not good for high frequency
updates; second, new addresses would be publicly given to attackers), the DNS will
point to a “puzzle server”. The puzzle server is a third-party server and can be seen as
a single point of failure. It must itself ensure that it cannot be successfully attacked by
the DDoS.
The role of the puzzle server is to send a cryptographic puzzle solvable only with
high computational costs. The solution of the puzzle is an ephemeral active IP address
assigned to the server that the user wants to connect to. The condition for a protection
is to have a too high computational cost for attackers (they have to calculate it for each
address jumping), but, on the other side the puzzle must be solvable by the legitimate
users. The point of the authors’ demonstration is that the legitimate user calculates
only one address (they do not stay connected, they only get information in a short
period of time), and attackers have to recalculate the puzzle for all new addresses. The
cost is higher for attackers than for legitimate users.
In the practical implementation, the puzzle has to be solved using Javascript. Other
implementations are possible, but the principle remains the same: an application layer
will permit filtering on the network layer.
Nevertheless, this solution is not really based on dynamical identifiers. It only gets
IP addresses in another way than standard DNS, and opens new TCP connections at
each period of time.
1.6.3 A Moving Target IPv6 Defense
A Moving Target IPv6 Defense [DGU+11], or MT6D, is a proposition of Matthew
Dunlop, Stephen Groat, William Urbanski, Randy Marchany and Joseph Tront. They
rotate periodically source and destination addresses. This has two benefits: privacy
improvement and protection against targeted Deny of Service attacks (the attacker has
to change periodically the address to attack).
To be fully transparent to the applications on the hosts and to transport proto-
cols, the dynamical identifiers are not directly used in the original packets. The real
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IPv6 packets sent by hosts are encapsulated in an UDP tunnel. This tunnel is estab-
lished and secured thanks to a symmetric key exchanged before the beginning of the
communication. The secret exchange is not addressed in the paper.
In this proposition, the tunnel uses real dynamical identifiers. The IPv6 addresses
and the UDP ports are following a pseudo-random sequence, without limitation of a
pre-reserved value. However, the cost to transform a static flow to a dynamical one
is high, because of the real packets encapsulation. Headers are added, reducing the
available bandwidth and adding problems to detect the MTU of the segment.
1.7 Toward dynamical identifiers
1.7.1 Dynamical identifiers without adding headers
In the whole history of network identifiers, the use of dynamical identifiers has never
really be considered. The first limitation was of course the restricted size of IPv4
addresses, but even with IPv6, many issues remains before deploying a real solution.
Since all the Internet is built on static identifiers, technical issues have to be to
analyzed and solved. One of them is to create a new definition of a flow, not based on
a five element tuple but on dynamical identifiers. The currents clock based flow identi-
fications bypass this issue with an additional external identifier (see Table 1.1). Before
our contribution, there was no function F taking as input the time and a standard IP
packet, giving as result an IP packet of the same size, with dynamical identifiers. Of
course, this constraint makes the challenge harder. One of the fundamental question is
the connection initialization.
Solution New identifiers Extra-headers
Address
switching
consequences
Shim6 extension
Sequence of
Shim6
identifiers
Shim6 headers
None, but
pre-allocation
of all IPv6
addresses
MT6D Sequence ofIPv6 addresses
Encapsulation
of the real
packet
Short time of
packet loss
Jumping puzzle
Ephemeral
destination IP
addresses
None, but
puzzle to solve
Reset the TCP
connection and
computational
cost
Our goal - spreading Sequence ofIPv6 addresses None None
Table 1.1: Clock based flow identification
Beyond these technical issues, an evaluation of the performance has to be made.
The spreading looks promising, but it has to be transparent for the network. The
solution has to be robust against packet loss, and the new identification paradigm has
to be robust. The goal is to achieve more security than the standard identification, but
not at the cost of too many false positive detection. The Chapter 3 presents a protocol
allowing the identification of flows thanks to dynamical identifiers, at a minimal cost.
We evaluate this solution on real networks in Chapter 5.
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1.7.2 From temporary to ephemeral addresses
A non technical issue remains: the lack of cooperation on the Internet. We assumed
for spreading a cooperation between both networks in communication7. Nevertheless,
on the Internet, each actor is independent, each actor has personal motivations, and
nobody has the power to pressurize all actors. This lack of cooperation makes hard to
deploy a new protocol on the Internet: nobody wants to be the first to deploy (and to
pay for) a new protocol that nobody uses. In the worst case, even when two networks
want to use a protocol, some devices on the path can still reject the packets using an
unknown protocol. This problem is sometimes called the “Ossification of the Internet”.
In this world, dynamical identifiers cannot be widely deployed now. It is however
possible to improve the idea of ephemeral addresses with some basic rules. The first
one is the isolation of flows: an identifier should not be used more than necessary (each
identifier should not identify more than one connection). Thanks to this first rule, a
second one becomes realistic: an identifier should be revoked as soon as possible (at the
end of the transmission). Current solutions are today not fine enough to accomplish
it (see Table 1.2). The lifetime of temporary addresses can be reduced (the lifetimes
announced in the table are only defined as default value in the standards, or not defined
at all), but since all of them use a global address for all applications, they cannot switch
to another without breaking all established connections.
Solution Defined in Lifetime of one address
Addresses
simultaneously
in use
Privacy Extension RFC 4941 One day by default 1
DHCPv6 TA RFC 3315 Typically several hours 1
CGA RFC 3972 Several days. Computationintensive 1
Opaque address RFC 7217 Stable for each network 1
Our goal Lifetime of a flow One per flow
Table 1.2: Solutions for ephemeral IPv6 addresses
A smarter management of ephemeral addresses does not break compatibility with
the current Internet, the cooperation of actors is not needed. We describe our solution
which complies with these constraints in the next chapter, and some an attempt to
deploy it in a real environment in Chapter 4.
7The intermediate routers are not impacted: they only have to route packets.
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Whereas Internet is built on network cooperations, the major part of communi-
cations is running without any explicit cooperation between end devices. A user will
access to information available on a website without having previously asked the owner
of the website, and will use for this communication the available standard protocols.
This base of available protocols has to be considered to deploy solutions on the
Internet: a new protocol not based on existing solutions will not be able to access to
many servers to open communications. The only way to deploy a new protocol is to
convince the remote network to deploy a new solution. They will proceed only if there
are some advantages to do it, mostly an excepted gain of money in the future.
For technologies to protect privacy of users, a cooperation between a majority of
remote networks cannot be expected. Information about users is valuable, and is the
core of most companies’ business plan. They will not deploy a protocol removing the
possibility to track users.
In this chapter, we assume that the remote network refuses to cooperate to protect
the user’s privacy. The remote network will not deploy any new protocol, and our
solution has to be based on the standard protocols like IPv6 and TCP. For accessing to
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an information source, for example a newspaper, the same protocols as the information
dealers have to be used.
This chapter is organized as follows: we first describe our goals and our motivation
to obfuscate the IP addresses of a computer. We then propose a lightweight solution to
provide some basic anonymity to users. The basic principle is to use a new ephemeral
address for each Internet flow. At the network layer, each flow is independent, each flow
uses unique identifiers. This way, the user privacy is protected because of the difficulty
to correlate activities of a user with an IP address.
To simplify the deployment, and to maximize the number of the available IPv6
addresses, we insert a device on the communication path. It does not change neither
the architecture or the address management of the local network. The role of this
device is restricted: it is only in charge of address rewriting, not of flow classification.
It is an architecture choice: the classification of Internet flows on the communication
path is hard and computationally intensive. For example, it is fast impossible to group
two connections sending encrypted data to an unique flow, without the knowledge of
the data content.
The flow classification done on the sender itself is then discussed. It appears to
be very efficient, the end device is the best place to classify several transport layer
connections into flows. Based on this classification, the end device adds a signalization
to each connection for their flow membership.
The next section of the chapter describes an implementation on the Linux Kernel.
We discuss technical choices, and detail the steps of packet processing on the inserted
device.
We close this chapter with an evaluation of our solution. Theoretical aspects are
presented first: we evaluate the collision risk introduced by ephemeral addresses, and
the consequences on upper layers. The last part of the chapter contains a description
of performance tests ran on the Internet with our implementation.
2.1 Protection of user privacy thanks to address obfusca-
tion
Since IP addresses are also used to identify and to track users of the Internet, it is
important to provide solutions to obfuscate their addresses. Of course, other various
ways exist to track users, for example through cookies [Set09] or the web browser
configuration [Pet10]. Nevertheless a privacy friendly Internet with secure IP addresses
is required first to build privacy protection on other layers.
Some full featured protections already exist, based on the David Chaum idea of
Mixes [Cha81]. The most popular is probably the Tor network [DMS04], based on
Onion routing. In this system, a packet will not go directly to the destination, but
will first be several times encrypted and then sent across several intermediate servers
(see Figure 2.1). At the end of this path, an output point will take the payload of the
packet and send it to the real destination. From the destination point a view, the source
address is the source address of the Tor outgoing server. The Tor network protects the
user’s privacy as long as someone does not control enough Tor nodes or is not able
to monitor the incoming and outgoing traffic flows to correlate traffic flows with each
other in time [DRH].
Based on the same Mixes idea but built on static path of trusted servers (see
Figure 2.2), the AN.ON project [BFK01] provides the same kind of privacy protection.
The path of a user communication is not random like in Tor, but the servers in the
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Figure 2.1: The Tor onion routing
”Mix Cascade“ can be trusted by users, since they know the organizations providing
the service. This service protects users as long as Mix Servers do not work together to
track them.
If these networks try to protect themselves against powerful attackers (like a gov-
ernmental organization, one example of world widely deployed surveillance is done by
the National Security Agency (NSA) [Gre13]), it is at the price of complex design and
deployment, and drawbacks for users. The first problem is usability: the user has to
know the tools and how to configure them. The second issue is the latency and band-
width overhead, because this system slows down the connection. The last one is the
congestion on these Mixes networks. To obtain a good anonymity set that provides
good privacy protection, a user has to share the Mixes networks with many users. In
the Tor network, the drawback is then a very slow connection. Even though there are
many Tor nodes, they are still not enough for the number of users, and all nodes do
not have a high bandwidth to the Internet. In the AN.ON project, it is possible to pay
for a better quality a service, thanks to high performance servers funded by users, but
this financial price can discourage users.
All these costs are probably too high for standard users who want to protect them-
selves against weaker attackers than the NSA. A prominent example of weaker attackers
would be a web service which tries to reidentify its users, like the Google and Facebook
companies. They are not in a position of man in the middle attacker and they cannot
monitor the international traffic. However, since a majority of websites adds embedded
objects like graphics provided by Google and Facebook services, they are in a very good
position to track all activities and interests of users.
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Figure 2.2: Data transfer in the AN.ON project
Figure 2.3: Architecture of the solution: spreading by the middlebox
2.2 Architecture and components for the obfuscation
2.2.1 Overview of the solution
To increase user privacy, we propose to assign an individual external address to each
flow. To each independent flow of packets, the connected device assigns a new flow
label1. The connected device still uses the same address for each flow, addresses are
stable locally.
To provide privacy protection, a middlebox is inserted at the border of a trusted
network (see Figure 2.3). The middlebox assigns a new external address to each pair
of (internal IP address, flow label) and rewrites the source addresses of the outgoing
packets and the destination addresses of the incoming packets. Because the middlebox
is in position of a border router, it receives all the packets from the local network.
Therefore, it does not need to send extra neighbor discovery packets. In contrast, if
the rewriting happens on the end devices, this solution implies some active neighbor
discovery.
Since some applications can be incompatible with address rewriting (similar to the
implications of NAT in IPv4 [Hai00]), a flow label set to zero is a signal to forbid
rewriting. This special label can be used if a temporary address is undesirable, for ex-
ample in case of IP source address filtering on the destination device or an incompatible
1Given the 20 bits for a flow label, the risk of exhaustion is quite low.
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Input Output
Internal IP Flow label External IP
α::1/64 120137 α:ece9:f330:fe60:188d/64
α::1/64 4162 α:19f8:83b3:af5a:2511/64
α::2/64 647513 α:6c40:9951:605f:8e03/64
α::2/64 0 α::2/64
Table 2.1: Example of rewriting on the middlebox
application layer.
To summarize, the intelligence to discriminate flows and optimize privacy relies
on end devices, and all rewritings rely on the middlebox, i.e. under control of the
network administrator. There is no need to change local address assignment policy.
The middlebox should be located between the local firewall and the Internet; it avoids
to rewrite firewall policies.
2.2.2 Computation on the middlebox
Since the “intelligence” of flow classification relies on connected devices, the middlebox
does not need to do a complex parsing of packet headers, and to follow a TCP stream
in a stateful way. However, it has to maintain a context to perform rewriting (cf. Ta-
ble 2.1). For each outgoing packet with an unknown pair (internal IP address, flow
label) (short (IP int, label)) the middlebox creates a context and generates a random
interface identifier. This random identifier becomes an address by concatenation with
the prefix, named external IP address (short IPext). The stored context is a 3-tuple
(IPint, label, IPext), and all following packets matching the pair (IPint, label) will be
rewritten with the IPext. For all incoming packets, the middlebox rewrites the destina-
tion address with IP int if a context exists, or applies the standard routing and firewall
policies. In both directions, the middlebox has to adjust the transport layer checksum,
since IPv6 addresses are part of the checksum. This adjustment is a simple operation,
explained in Section 2.4.3.
Note that a flow (defined by all packets sharing the same source IP and the same
flow label) can be made of several TCP connections (or other transport protocols). For
example, we recommend to use the same flow for all elements of a given webpage. The
middlebox itself does not care about upper protocol layers, because the flow assignment
is done on the end device.
2.2.3 Flow label assignment by application
The connected device is the best place to discriminate flows and to assign flow labels.
For example, a peer-to-peer application probably needs to use the same address for
several TCP connections, a Web browser knows if one connection is related to another,
etc. In our case, the best way is to modify the application to assign flow labels efficiently.
However, this solution is no realistic. The lack of standardized API for flow label
is discussed in Chapter 4. We found some workaround, and we propose a solution to
assign one flow label to each application in the Section 4.6.
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Figure 2.4: Outgoing (to the Internet) packet processing
2.3 Implementation with the Linux Kernel
2.3.1 Address rewriting and flow management by the middlebox
To test our solution, we implemented and deployed the middlebox in a real network
environment. The middlebox is based on a standard Linux Kernel, and we added a
Netfilter module to spread addresses. The middlebox is in charge of rewriting addresses
for outgoing and incoming packets.
Outgoing packets processing
The Figure 2.4 depicts the processing of packets going to the Internet. For each outgoing
packet, we read the flow label information and the IP source address in step one. If this
label is zero, we stop the work of the module and the standard policy of the kernel is
applied (step two and eight). Otherwise, we check if a context with the pair of source
address and flow label already exists (step three).
If the context does not exist, we have to create one (step four). The next step is to
generate a random address, and to check if the address is not in collision as explained
in Section 2.4.1. The prefix part is static and cannot be rewritten, but it is possible
to configure the length of the prefix (routing information), to maximize the size of the
rewritable address part. We add the new external address to the pair (source IP address,
flow label), and append this context to the context table.
If a context exists, or after the initialization of a context, we rewrite the source
address with the value stored in the fetched context (step six). Afterwards we have
to adjust the transport layer checksum (step seven). There is no standard way to
rewrite this checksum, therefore we have to write code for each protocol. Currently,
our implementation supports the three most popular protocols: TCP, UDP and ICMP
(cf. Section 2.4.3). After this rewriting, we return the packet to apply standard kernel
policy.
2.3. IMPLEMENTATION WITH THE LINUX KERNEL 27
Figure 2.5: Incoming (from the Internet) packet processing
Incoming packets processing
The Figure 2.5 depicts the processing of incoming packets. We first only read the
destination address in step one. We check if a context exists for this address in step
two. If not, the packet is transmitted to the standard kernel way. Otherwise, we rewrite
the destination address with the value stored in the context (step 3). The last step is
to adjust the transport layer checksum, and to mark the timestamps.
Identification of a context
The identification of a context has to be efficient on both directions. The identification
of outgoing flows is done by matching the source address and the flow label with all
existing contexts. For incoming packet, the identifier of the context is the destination
address, unique by nature of our solution.
We implement these searches with two hash tables, one for outgoing packets us-
ing “source IP address + label” as key value, and the second one for incoming packet
using destination address as key value. The Linux Kernel provides one internal imple-
mentation of hash tables, that we use in our implementation. The key function are
DEFINE_HASHTABLE(), hash_add() and hash_del() to define a table, insert and delete
an element.
Since hash tables are fast and consume reduced memory, our double hash table
allows fast matching between packets and contexts.
Cleanup of old context
At the term of a flow, the middlebox has to remove the corresponding context to
potentially reassign the address and to free the memory used. Nevertheless, there is no
concept of connection and there are no communication messages to signal the end of a
flow in the IP network.
In IPv4 networks, RFC 4787 and 5382 [AJ07, GBF+08] give some recommenda-
tions to maintain a connection context for a NAT. In our case, it is not possible (and
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desirable) to trace the state of a TCP connection. On the one hand, a flow can span
more than a single TCP connection, on the other hand additional transport protocols
can be in use. The only available solution is to introduce a timeout after an inactivity
period. It should not be less than 120 seconds, according to recommendation for IPv4.
A large timeout period will help to avoid breaking established connections, at cost of
resource consumption. Based on empirical tests, we recommend a value of 30 minutes,
which gives a good trade-off between resource consumption and connection stability.
The local administrator can overwrite this standard configuration in case of particular
needs, such as long inactive TCP connections.
To implement the cleanup of old contexts, one solution is to use internal timers
available in the operating system. On Linux, it is possible to use timers with the
functions add_timer() and mod_timer(), to initiate a timer at the first run and to
reinitialize the timer after each cleanup. This timer is in charge to run a function
processing all timestamps of contexts, and to remove the too old ones.
2.3.2 Our Netfilter Kernel module
To test and evaluate our solution, we developed a Linux Netfilter module. Our module
uses the capability of Netfilter to accept some ”hooks“ from an external module. These
hooks are registered with the function nf_register_hook(), and allow full processing
of packets in the module2, without any modification of the standard packet processing.
At the end of the module processing, it is possible to return a reject or an accept
command for the packets. In case of reject, processing of the packets stops here.
Configuration of the hooks
There are three main configuration parameters for a Netfilter hook. The first one is
the type of packets to deal with. For us, it is always the parameter PF_INET6 for IPv6
packets. The second is the localization of the hook in the packet processing. The
Figure 2.6 depicts the five possibilities. In our case, only two cases are relevant: before
the routing process and after it. The last configuration is the priority of this hook
in the packet processing for this place, for example it can be done before or after the
firewall rules.
In our module, we configure two hooks. The first one works on outgoing packets,
after the routing decision. We set the configuration NF_INET_POST_ROUTING for the
hook place, and NF_IP6_PRI_NAT_SRC for the priority, i.e. the standard priority to
rewrite the source address of a packet.
The second hook works on incoming packet. Since the rewritten IP destination
address can affect the routing, the packet processing has to be done before the routing
decision. We configure our hook with the parameter NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING. For the
priority of the hook, we choose the standard NF_IP6_PRI_NAT_DST value.
Registration of the cleanup timer
The Linux Kernel has a timer interface that all modules can use. The definition of a
timer is done with the DEFINE_TIMER() function, and is enabled by the add_timer()
function. At the end of the given time period, the timer calls a defined function (here
the cleanup of old contexts). Our function is here in charge to recall the next cleanup
with the help of the function mod_timer().
2Including modifications of headers as well than packet payload.
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Figure 2.6: The five location of Netfilter Hooks
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Kernel version compatibility
The Linux Kernel is always under active development, and there is no guaranty of
internal stability, meaning that internal functions can change at any time. For example,
the definition of the function called by a hook changed in October 2013, invalidating
the code of the module.
The module is currently tested on Linux Kernel between version 3.2 and 3.14.
2.4 Evaluation and consequences
Our middlebox is an active component on the network: it rewrites packet addresses
before the transmission to the next hop. We evaluate the consequences of our solution
in three parts in this section. First, we evaluate the risk of collision between addresses
allocated on the local network and generated addresses. Second, we analyze the com-
patibility of our address rewriting with the current Internet. Third, we evaluate the
performances of the middlebox.
2.4.1 Risk of address collision
Uniqueness of external addresses
Since a generated address is used as an unique flow identifier for incoming packets, the
address has to be unique behind all local subnets. In the same way, if the rewriting
uses the same prefix for IPint and IPext, a generated address cannot be equal to an
address allocated to an end device. Here, there is only a negligible risk of collisions
between randomly generated addresses and those already assigned to end devices.
The first condition can be easily checked by looking at the context table. Thanks to
the huge IPv6 address space, there is no risk of address exhaustion, even when setting
one address to each flow. The verification of the second condition is more complex.
A solution would be to check whether the address is not already in use; by using the
Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP). Nevertheless, it is unacceptable for at least two
reasons. First, it increases the latency for all connection initializations, because the
middlebox has to wait until the NDP timed out before making a decision. Second,
no response to a NDP request does not mean that this address is not in use, e.g. the
device can currently be down.
Mitigation of the collision risk
To mitigate the problem of collision between generated and allocated addresses, we
propose the following:
• The middlebox can be configured not to use the autoconfiguration space derived
from the MAC address (this means removing results with 4th byte and 5th byte
set respectively to 0xFF and 0xFE). This configuration should be enabled by
default to prevent conflicts with the standard configuration;
• In case of DHCPv6 address distribution, the DHCP address space should not be
included in the rewriting space configured on the middlebox;
• In case of CGA or static configured addresses, the administrator can manually
forbid addresses;
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• In any case, the middlebox should maintain a list of devices currently in commu-
nication. Clearly this is not exhaustive, since devices can be connected without
established connections.
These four rules eliminate the risk of collisions in most networks, and minimize it
for some special cases. Additionally, it is important to notice that the risk of collision
is actually very low – even without applying the rules mentioned above. We discuss
this risk in the next paragraph.
Computation of the collision risk
The evaluation of the probability of a collision is a variant of the “birthday paradox”,
as defined in [vM39] and [Fel50]. Given a pool of n addresses and already j addresses
assigned, the probability p¯(n, j) to choose the j + 1 address without collision is:
p¯(n, j) = 1− j
n
= n− j
n
(2.1)
This means that if we assign J addresses in a free space, we have a probability to
have no collision of:
P¯ (n, J) = p¯(n, 0).p¯(n, 1) . . . p¯(n, J − 1) = n · (n− 1) . . . (n− J + 1)
nJ
(2.2)
Then, the probability to have at least one collision is:
P (n, J) = 1− P¯ (n, J) = 1− n · (n− 1) . . . (n− J + 1)
nJ
(2.3)
That can be rewritten as:
P (n, J) = 1−
(
1− 1
n
)
·
(
1− 2
n
)
. . .
(
1− J − 1
n
)
(2.4)
P (n, J) = 1−
J−1∏
i=1
(
1− i
n
)
(2.5)
Since all i are less or equal to J −1, we can give an upper bound for the probability
with:
P (n, J) ≤ 1−
(
1− J − 1
n
)J−1
(2.6)
We can now perform an evaluation of this probability. In a network with only one
prefix of the minimal auto-configuration size, the interface identifier uses 64 bits. We
can calculate n = 264. On a big network with one thousand computers, where each
of them maintains one thousand flows, we need to allocate J = 1000 · 1000 = 106
addresses. A simple computation informs us than the probability of collision is less at
least than 5.5 · 10−8.
Table 2.2 gives some collision probability for some network sizes. We take the
hypothesis of 1000 flows for each device, a very large number for standard devices. In
this table, our evaluation is very careful: the prefix size is the minimum acceptable size
for these kinds of networks.
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Network type # of devices Flows per device Prefix size Collision risk
Home network 10 1000 64 < 5.6 · 10−12
Small company 100 1000 58 < 1.1 · 10−11
Campus network 50000 1000 48 < 2.1 · 10−9
ISP network 60 000 000 1000 32 < 4.6 · 10−8
Table 2.2: Probability of collisions on some networks.
2.4.2 Compatibility analysis with the current Internet
Devices involved by the communication
In order to support wide spread deployment, a smooth integration of our solution into
existing networks has to be considered. In our case, we only need to deploy middleboxes
at the border of the networks and an adaptation of the end devices to enable address
rewriting. More specifically the necessary changes are as follows:
Remote routers and servers: since our solution is based on standard IPv6 pack-
ets, it is compatible with the standard IPv6 network. There is no need to upgrade
intermediate routers or remote servers. It can be deployed locally without cooperation
or impact on other networks: the real source addresses are obfuscated but packets are
still valid.
Local devices: for local devices, packets without flow label are not rewritten and
which induces no compatibility implications. Though, for full benefit of our solution,
upgrades are usually necessary. First, not all Operating Systems (OSes) provide means
to set flow labels. Second, on compatible OSes, the applications have to use the flow
label option. We discuss assignment of flow labels in Chapter 4, with a testing of popular
Operating Systems in Section 4.2 and a solution for a Linux client in Section 4.6.
Common address translation issues
Address rewriting is a kind of address translation which can have the following conse-
quences:
IP addresses sent by application layer: first, some applications send the IP ad-
dress to the peer within the application layer protocols, for example File Transfer
Protocol (FTP) and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). If transmitting the address at
the application layer is mandatory for a given protocol, the addresses cannot be easily
rewritten.
ICMP packets encapsulation: The ICMP protocol is used to send messages sig-
naling errors in the transmission. An ICMP error message containing IP addresses is
encapsulated in another ICMP packet, and send back to the transmission source. The
internal addresses quoted in the encapsulated ICMP packets have to be rewritten too.
It makes parsing a little bit more complex but it does not break ICMP messages.
IPsec: the case of IPsec leads to the same case as Network Prefix Translation (NPTv6)
and the same conclusion: peers should be able to detect the address translator, and
IPsec should work.
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Disabling the ephemeral addresses: In all cases, our solution is better than stan-
dard address translation since it can easily be disabled. For all incompatible connec-
tions, applications can set the flow label to zero, the default value.
2.4.3 Performance of the middlebox
Checksum computation
In IPv6, there is no checksum contained in the IP header but the transport layer
protocols like TCP and UDP are in charge of error detections and therefore utilize
a checksum. This checksum has to be adapted if a rewriting happens. Fortunately,
the flow label is not part of the checksum calculation and can be overwritten without
implication. Nevertheless, the source address rewriting has an impact on the transport
layer protocol checksum.
The large IPv6 address space supports some checksum neutral modifications, like
in NPTv6 [WB11]. However, this solution is unacceptable in our case. A checksum
neutral modification gives a way to group all rewritten addresses of a device, with
a simple checksum calculation of the source address. This removes the unlinkability
between several random addresses.
Nevertheless, thanks to good properties of the standard Internet checksums, the cost
of checksum computation is low, and an incremental update is possible [Rij94]. A fully
computation of the new packet checksum Cnew is not needed, the difference CD between
the 16-bit checksum Cint of the internal IP address and the 16-bit checksum Cext of
the external IP address can be easily added to the already computed checksum Cold:
Cnew = Cold + (Cint − Cext) = Cold + CD
.
There are two strategies to recompute the packets checksums of a flow. The first
one is to compute it for each packet, without caching. It reduces the memory load of
the middlebox, but at the cost of more CPU consumption. The other solution it to
calculate CD = Cint−Cext once, and to cache this value. Our tests of CPU performance
and memory consumption are done with and without this cache.
CPU consumption and cache of the checksum
To evaluate the CPU consumption of our solution, we made a profiling of the Kernel.
We used the OProfile software, part of the standard tools of the Linux Kernel package.
Our middlebox was a virtual machine with a 2.4 GHz CPU, and a fast network between
the two networks (bandwidth is about a bidirectional 1.5Gb/s).
The CPU of the middlebox itself was not really loaded, and our code had only a
little impact on the global CPU consumption for the packet processing. Results are
summarized in Table 2.3. The first column is a data transfer without address rewriting,
our middlebox is only set as a router. The second column is with a standard NATP
enabled (standard implementation of the Linux 3.12 Kernel). The third column is the
rewriting without caching of the checksum modification; computed for each packet.
The last one presents the results with rewriting and checksum caching enabled.
The rewriting is always a very little part of packet processing and is not a problem
for the processor. As expected, better performances are obtained with the checksum
caching. Our implementation parses less information than the IPv6 NATP of the Linux
Kernel, and reaches therefore better performances. The global CPU consumption for
the NAT column includes the overhead of the conntrack table, used by the NATP
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Rewriting
disabled NAT
Rewriting
without
cache
Rewriting
with cache
Global CPU
consumption 9.7% 12.6% 10.1% 10%
Middlebox/NAT
consumption ∅ 0.92% 0.35% 0.29%
Table 2.3: CPU consumption on the middlebox.
module. The NAT consumption includes only the cost of the NAT module, without
the conntrack table.
Memory impact
Within a context, the following pieces of information have to be stored:
• the real source address IPint of the computer (128 bits);
• the randomized source address IPext (128 bits);
• the flow label (20 bits), stored in an integer (32 bits);
• the cached checksum difference CD (16 bits);
• the “last seen” value, to remove old entries (same size as the jiffies_64 kernel
variable, i.e 64 bits);
• two node structures in the hash tables (128 bits each).
The total size is about 80 octets for each context. With the current hypothesis of 1000
computers with 1000 flows each, we need about 80MB to store all contexts. On a home
network with 5 computers and 100 flows each, less than 100KB of memory is necessary.
Moreover, each context needs less space than a usual entry of the conntrack table
used for NAT in IPv4. Therefore, the memory consumption of our solution will not be
a problem for modern routers with NAT capacities.
2.5 Conclusion
Our solution has many advantages in comparison with Privacy Extensions or a set of
random addresses on an end device. First, the set of addresses is larger. When the
Privacy Extensions address is restricted to the local prefix, the middlebox can rewrite
addresses on all the address space available on the end site, or the network located after
it. For example, we can imagine a middlebox at the border of the ISP network, with
a very large address space and a large number of users. Since all users cannot trust
the ISP, one feature of the middlebox is the possibility to cascade several middleboxes.
One typical architecture could be one at the border of the home network, and one at
the border of the ISP network.
Second, a Privacy Extension is restricted to only one address in use for all applica-
tions. It is not enough to protect user privacy: the traffic of a session is still easy to
detect, and all activities of a user (Online Banking, chatting, Video Games. . . ) can be
grouped. With one address assigned to each flow, we provide the best protection for a
light solution, without adding intermediate servers.
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The major drawback is to introduce a stateful device on the Internet path. In
case of device reinitialization, all contexts will be lost and current connections will be
broken. It is however already the case in the most of Internet networks, due to the
NAT devices.
The resources consumption of our middlebox is quite low, allowing a scalable solu-
tion to be deployed on large networks. It is an important feature, since larger networks
allow bigger anonymity sets and a better protection of user privacy.
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Chapter 3
Spoofing protection based on
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If two end networks agree to cooperate, new protocols can be imagined to protect
privacy and to enhance security. The cooperation of end networks is assumed in this
Chapter, but not the cooperation of intermediate Autonomous System (AS) on the
communication path. Indeed, an upgrade of all intermediate devices is not realistic at
all. The designed protocol has to be compatible with the IPv6 standard to provide the
connectivity between two end networks across the Internet. The solution we propose
protects against spoofing on the top of IPv6.
The present chapter is organized as follows. We first explain our motivation and
the goals of our solution in the Section 3.1. To explain it, we do a short overview of the
current flow identifications and spoofing protections on the Internet. We then define
the concept of address spreading, an attacker model, and the expected properties of
this protection for this attacker model.
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We present the best way to easily enable spreading in Section 3.2. Indeed, sev-
eral architecture choices are possible. The first one is an end-to-end solution, with
a Neighbor Discovery problem for the last router. The second solution is to add an
intermediate device on the communication path. This solution is easier to deploy, but
cannot provide an end-to-end security. However, malicious packets are rejected as soon
as possible, protecting the network bandwidth. The last solution is to delegate a ad-
dress prefix to each end devices. The IPv6 address space is large enough to allow this
intermediate solution.
The main contribution of this Chapter is presented in Section 3.3. The protocol and
the prerequisite are described in details. We explained step by step the initialization
of each connection, and the security gain added by this protection. Since the step by
step description follows the ideal case, without any loss of packets, we describe the
real processing of packets by spreaders. This processing works with all transport layer
protocols, and is insensitive to packet loss.
We end this Chapter with an evaluation of the false detection risk in Section 3.4.
The first issue is the inevitable latency in the packet transmissions across the Internet.
If the packet arrives to late to the receiver, the address spreader will reject the packet.
The second issue is the need of clock synchronization, which is never perfect. We
propose a mitigation of the both issues with the introduction of overlapping temporal
windows of previous and following addresses.
3.1 Address spoofing on the Internet and countermeasure
3.1.1 Standard identification of a flow
An address spoofing attack relies on packets with a forged IP source address. Since
the source address is often the only identifier available for computer identification, the
attacker can bypass all defenses of a network.
Indeed, a traditional firewall bases identifies flows with the traditional five element
tuple (IPsrc, IPdst, NextHeader, Portsrc, Portdst), not reliable by nature. The source
IP address and the source port especially can be easily manipulated by an attacker. If
an attacker is able to send packets with a spoofed source IP address, he will be in good
position to try TCP reset attacks, to inject packets on the destination network, to try
a targeted attack to the destination, etc.
Firewalls can have extra features to identify packets. For example, a stateful firewall
can follow all packets and states of a TCP communication. If a packet does not follow
the TCP standard, it will be dropped.
3.1.2 Other spoofing protections
Since the source address is not reliable at all, some solutions exist to enforce packet
identification, thanks to other fields in IP headers. One of them is based on the Time-
To-Live field (named Hop Limit in IPv6). The principle of the protection is to drop
packets with non-standard values in comparison to other packets from the same source
[WJS07]. For each totally or often unused IPv4 field, a solution exists to use it for
spoofing protection. One example is the identification field, that can be used against
address spoofing [SWKA00]. However, this idea is not allowed in RFCs [Tou13], and
this field is not available anymore in IPv6.
Another class of spoofing protection uses the cooperation of routers on the commu-
nication path. In case of cooperation between all Internet operators, this could solve
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the problem. By rejecting outgoing packets with invalid source address, an operator
enforce the security of the Internet. This has been documented for 14 years in the
RFC 2827 [FS00], but it is still not enough deployed to protect against spoofing. The
cooperation of all Autonomous Systems (AS) is not a realistic assumption. One other
way is to use trusted routers on the communication path to mark legitimate packets
[HK03]. This solution needs a field to write the extra identifiers, which reduces the
MTU or implies fragmentation of packets. Moreover, it is complex to deploy.
Since no solution is really satisfactory at the IP layer, some protections are based on
transport or application layers. At the transport layer, identifiers can be randomized
(named ports in case of TCP and UDP). Examples are the port hopping proposal
[LT04], or the port knocking [AYA12].
A firewall can use one or several of these solutions to protect a network. They
all have advantages and drawbacks. The identification due to the Hop Limit is not
really secure, but is easy to deploy. The spoofing protection thanks to the router at
the border of the AS is the most efficient long term solution, but probably not realistic
at this time. An upgrade of hardware and router configurations is expensive, and
convincing all Internet actors takes time.
Other protection mechanisms are not based only on IP headers, and are therefore
specific of a protocol or an application.
3.1.3 Definition of address spreading
Since network identifiers are used in security solutions, the overall security can be im-
proved with the proof of address ownership. In this chapter, we propose a new security
paradigm to enforce security without adding any external information to packets. Our
solution is therefore not specific of a transport protocol or an application.
With IPv6, the large IP address space allows new security opportunities, like CGA
[Aur05]. Whereas all IPv4 solutions had to minimize the number of IP addresses in
use, many addresses can now be used. Our solution provides security based on address
spreading. In our solution, source and destination IP addresses of a flow are frequently
renewed, according to a temporal sequence. If this sequence is only known by the
sender and the receiver, it enhances the security of the identification.
Since only IP addresses are modified, the solution is pretty simple. It does not
require complex encapsulation (like IPsec tunnel does), and can be followed by a firewall
with knowledge of a shared secret.
We consider a situation, where an attacker wants to inject some traffic with a
spoofed source IP address. He can be on the transmission path and also able to read
the legitimate traffic.
The solution does not try to protect against flow rebuilding, meaning that the
attacker can use upper layer information like TCP ports and sequence numbers to
rebuild the real flow. The solution protects against spoofing: packets from the attacker
will be identified. As a side effect, we provide protection against correlation between
flows and end devices, since addresses are obfuscated. An attacker cannot guess the
real source and destination addresses of a flow, and cannot group several flows to one
source or destination only with the information available at the network layer.
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Figure 3.1: Address spreading without extra device (solution 3.2.1).
3.2 Discussion on the best places to enable the spreading
3.2.1 On the end device
The key principle of spreading is to generate and follow an address sequence on both end
devices (see Figure 3.1). This strategy allows an end-to-end security, and computers
do not have to delegate security to someone.
However, this solution implies an upgrade of the local router. The main issue arises
in the situation where end devices do not get a delegated prefix, but share the local
prefix with several end devices. The use of many addresses will:
• flood the network with Neighbor Discovery packets. The router is not aware of
the spreading, and cannot know the link between the temporal sequence of IP
addresses and the static MAC address;
• saturate the Neighbor table of the router. With a too frequent address switch,
the router will not be able to store all mappings between IP addresses and MAC
addresses;
• introduce a latency at each IP address switch, due to the Neighbor Discovery.
The second issue of spreading on a local network is the incompatibility with address
management policies of the administrator. For example, a secure local network should
use Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) [Aur05] to prevent local spoofing of
addresses. Address spreading is incompatible with CGA, as well as address attribution
via a DHCPv6 server.
3.2.2 Solution with a patched router
To solve the problem of Neighbor Discovery packets and the saturation of the neighbor
table, a solution is to patch the router to follow the sequence of IP destination addresses
in the Neighbor Table. Thus, the router does not have to know the sequence of source
addresses received from the Internet, and is not able to insert a packet in a flow.
This architecture is quite complex, implying both a modification of both routers
and end devices to work.
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Figure 3.2: Spreaders at the local network border (solution 3.2.3 and 3.2.4).
3.2.3 On the communication path
As a first approach, we propose to simplify the problem by adding new “spreader”,
devices on the communication path. These devices are able to rewrite a packet flow
with stable addresses into a packet flow with dynamical addresses. The spreader can
directly be on the network border (see Figure 3.2) or at the border of the trusted zone
(see Figure 3.3).
The first positive argument for this architecture is the simplicity to deploy it. An
administrator does not need to upgrade and configure each end device, but can simply
insert the spreader in the network. It has the same benefits as a modified router
following the relation between IP and MAC address, and less drawbacks.
The second point is the possibility of bad packet filtering. Since malicious packets
consume resources, and can be sent to simply saturate the network bandwidth, mali-
cious packets have to be discriminated as soon as possible. With the introduction of
spreaders at the border of the trust zone, this goal is achieved efficiently.
We choose this architecture to simplify concepts and experimentations.
3.2.4 Delegation of addresses prefixes to the end device
A spreader on the path is not the sole solution. Enough IPv6 addresses are available
to delegate one address prefix to each end device. This has the advantage to solve the
mapping problem between MAC addresses and IP addresses, because the intermediate
device sends only IP packets matching a prefix to a MAC address.
In this case, the end device is in charge of Interface Identifiers management and
can actually be considered as a “router”. The architecture at the network layer is the
same as in the previous method (see Figure 3.2. The delegation of address prefixes is
the best architecture in terms of simplicity and security. However, it only works on
networks with a large enough IPv6 address space.
Since one end device with a delegated prefix is equivalent from a network point of
view to an architecture with spreaders on the path, our work only mentions “spreaders”,
and our tests were based on a network with spreaders on the path. Again, it perfectly
works if the end device does the spreading itself: our solution provides end-to-end
security, as well as a device protecting the local network.
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Figure 3.3: Spreaders at the trusted zone border (solution 3.2.3).
3.3 Detailed process of the protocol
3.3.1 General principles
Prerequisite of the solution
To enable spreading, at least two networks have to be configured for the mapping
between the dynamical addresses and stable identifiers.
This configuration is done by adding a spreader at the border of each network. The
two spreaders have to share a secret, that an attacker cannot guess.
Spreader initialization
At the spreader initialization a configuration for each compatible peer with a shared
secret has to be created. This configuration contains the prefix list of destinations (to
catch packets to be rewritten) and a function to derive cryptographic keys from the
shared secret.
Exchange of session data
One of our goals is to spread each data flow with a unique address sequence, making
more difficult for an attacker to group all flows of one end device. To do so, both
spreaders have to exchange session data at each flow initialization. There are several
ways to accomplish it. The first one is to add several extra packets to initiate a
context for each flow. It increases latency of connection initialization, and costs some
bandwidth.
The second one is to add extra information on real packets, for example by adding
one extra IPv6 extension header. Since this extension would be added by the spreader
and not by end devices, it could result in some maximal transport unit problem. Indeed,
this header cannot be added on a big packet, and two solutions exist in that case. The
first one is to fragment the packet on the spreader, which is not allowed by IPv6
RFCs. The second one is to send a “too big” error to end devices, which reduces the
performance of all packets for the session.
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Figure 3.4: Time diagram of a connection initialization.
Both solutions are not satisfactory. We choose a third one, with the encoding of
all information in IPv6 source and destination addresses by spreaders. No extra data
have to be added into packet payloads. It limits the amount of exchangeable data, but
does not induce bandwidth costs or latency due to extra packets.
3.3.2 Step by step initialization
Notations
The description of the protocol follows the same steps as a TCP handshake connection
initialization, depicted in Figure 3.4.
We introduce the following notation for the packet rewriting (summarized in Ta-
ble 3.1): PA and PB are the network prefixes for hosts A and B. IPA and IPB are the
real IP addresses of host A and B, concatenation of prefixes and interface identifiers are
noted IIDA and IIDB. IPnsrc is the rewritten source IP address of the packet in step n,
and IPndst the destination IP address in the same step. Since we cannot rewrite prefixes,
IPnsrc and IPndst are concatenations of a stable prefix (PA or PB) and a rewritten value.
Local network On the Internet
Steps Real IPSource
Real IP
Destina-
tion
Rewritten IP source Rewritten IPDestination
1a → 1b
SYN IPA IPB IP
1
src = PA|IID1src IP 1dst = PB|IID1dst
2a → 2b
SYN, ACK IPB IPA IP
2
src = PB|IID2src IP 2dst = PA|IID2dst
3a → 3b
ACK IPA IPB IP
3
src = PA|IID3src IP 3dst = PB|IID3dst
Table 3.1: IP address notation
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Connection initialization – first packet
Symmetrical rewriting by spreaders: rewriting begins with step 1a, when the
spreader A receives a packet with a destination IP address matching one of the prefix
in the spreader configuration.
As soon as it receives the first packet of a connection, the spreader A computes the
new source and destination IP addresses with the help of a cryptographic function. We
choose the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [Pub01] encryption, but any other
encryption system allowing blocks length of 128 bits could be used.
The key of the AES function is derived from the shared secret, thanks to a Key
derivation function (KDF). The KDF derives a new encryption key each new period
of time. One example of KDF is defined in RFC 5869 [KE10]. We call this key K(t),
with K the KDF.
The AES function takes as an input a block of interface identifiers of both hosts A
and B. Since the AES standard assumes a block length of 128 bits, the last 64 bits of
both interface identifiers are taken, even though if they can be longer. The spreader
divides the 128 bits of the AES output in two blocks of 64 bits to replace the last 64
bits of IPA and IPB.
IID1src = AES(IIDA|IIDB,K(t))[0− 63] (3.1)
IID1dst = AES(IIDA|IIDB,K(t))[64− 127] (3.2)
After the address rewriting, the packet follows the standard routing and filtering pro-
cess. This ends step 1a.
On the destination spreader, stable addresses are recomputed by the AES decryp-
tion function (step 1b). After this computation, the destination spreader checks the
validity of the transport layer checksum (this checksum is mandatory for UDP and
TCP with IPv6). If the checksum is valid, the packet follows the standard policy of
routing and filtering.
If the checksum value is not valid, it can be a sign of transmission problem. Another
possible cause of this invalid checksum is an attempt of an attacker to inject a packet
in the network, with spoofing of the source address. Indeed, IPv6 addresses are part
of the checksum computation and if addresses after the second spreader are not the
same as addresses sent by the source device, it invalidates the checksum. Since the
attacker does not know the shared secret, he cannot compute the AES encryption and
the generated packet will be detected by the spreader.
In more details, Table 3.2 depicts the status of the checksum at the different steps
of the communication. The checksum seems invalid during the time packets are trans-
mitted between the two spreaders, but it does cause any problem since nobody needs
to have a look at the checksum on the communication path. On the contrary, we see
in Table 3.3 that the checksum of a spoofed packet seems valid on the Internet, but
invalid after the second spreader’s rewriting.
Security analysis of the rewriting: if the attacker is aware of this spoofing pro-
tection, he can try to guess the checksum modification added by the spreaders AES
encryption. The length of the checksum field is 16 bits, which gives one chance out of
65 536 to find the good one. This value is only valid for a short time and for a given
address couple, the next value of K at t + 1 will give another checksum modification
implied by the AES encryption.
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Position Checksum validity Remarks
Local network Valid Computed by the end device
Internet Invalid Addresses have been rewritten, itinvalidates the checksum
Remote network Valid Addresses have been rewritten bythe second spreader
Table 3.2: Checksum validity for a real packet.
Position Checksum validity Remarks
Attacker’s
network Valid Computed by the attacker
Internet Valid No rewriting if the attacker is notaware of protection
Remote network Invalid Addresses have been rewritten bythe second spreader
Table 3.3: Checksum validity for a spoofed packet.
This security mechanism is not good enough to filter all packets of an attacker, and
some packets can bypass this protection. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that
if the checksum is valid, the attacker cannot guess the rewritten addresses and cannot
know what is the rewritten destination address. The chance to successfully contact a
real computer with a valid address is very low. Indeed, if we assume that the rewriting
is fully random, an attacker has first to bypass the checksum (one chance out of 65 536).
If the checksum is valid, a targeted attack on a computer on the remote network has
one chance out of 264 to reach the good address, since the attacker cannot guess the
rewritten value after the AES decryption.
Steps Rewritten IID Source Rewritten IID Destination
1a → 1b
SYN
IID1src = AES(IIDA|IIDB,
K(t))[0− 63]
IID1dst = AES(IIDA|IIDB,
K(t))[64− 127]
2a → 2b
SYN, ACK IID
2
src = random() IID2dst = g(t, secret, IID1src)
3a → 3b
ACK IID
3
src = g(t, secret, IID1src) IID3dst = g(t, secret, IID2src)
Table 3.4: Rewriting in initialization steps.
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Initialization of the connection – response of the remote spreader
The goal of the address rewriting on the first packet is to protect an initialization of a
connection by an attacker. For the next packets, we create a pseudo-random sequence
for each data flow, generated by a function g. This function g is a generator of a random
sequence, for example a hash function like SHA-1 [rJ01].
The secure generation begins with the step 2a. To do it, the second spreader
rewrites the first reply packet of a client with a random value as IP source, and a value
computed from the source IP address value in the first packet for the destination.
IID2src = random() (3.3)
IID2dst = g(t, secret, IID1src) (3.4)
The generator g takes as input the current time, the shared secret between the two
networks and another value of the size of an IP address. This rewriting introduces a
random value for the sequence, but the flow is still easy to identify for both spreaders
with the IP address destination set to a value that the first spreader can recognize.
In step 2b, the first spreader recognizes the IP destination address IP 2dst with the
help of a context previously stored. This packet is an acknowledgment of the initial-
ization, spreading can now really begin. The spreader saves the value of the IP source
(randomized in step 2a) and rewrites the source and destination IP addresses to the
real stable values stored in the context.
It ends the second step. The first spreader is now sure of the connection initializa-
tion, and can use the random value to bootstrap a new random sequence.
Connection initialization – Acknowledgment to the second spreader
The step 3a begins as soon as the next packet is sent by the device from the network
A. Both source and destination addresses are now spread with:
IID3src = g(t, secret, IID1src) (3.5)
IID3dst = g(t, secret, IID2src) (3.6)
In step 3b, the spreader B recognizes the spread couple with the help of the stored
context. This packet is an acknowledgment of the random value sent in step 2a, and
the second spreader is now aware of the success of the initialization. Initialization steps
are summarized in Table 3.4.
Rewriting during the life of the connection
After the step 3b, both spreaders follow the same sequence of rewriting according
to the computation of g(t, secret, IID1src) and g(t, secret, IID2src). The rewriting is
symmetrical and both end devices receive stable addresses. An attacker cannot inject
any traffic since he does not know the next addresses to use.
3.3.3 Detailed packet processing on spreaders
The protocol described in Section 3.3.2 is an ideal situation. No packet loss is assumed,
and both end devices use the TCP protocol. It helps to understand how it works, since
our protocol follows the same handshake mechanism as TCP.
Nevertheless, the solution has to be robust against packet loss and data retrans-
mission. In the same way, it has to be compatible with transport protocols, like UDP,
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where a connection does not follow a rigorous initialization procedure, or ICMP with
short sessions like a simple Echo request. We detail in this section a packet processing
by spreaders, which actually supports packet loss and which is transport layer protocol
independent.
Detailed steps of packets processing (outgoing packets)
Packet processing from the local network to the Internet is depicted in Figure 3.5. For
each outgoing packet, the spreader extracts the tuple (IPsrc, IPdst, f lowlabel) (step 1).
It checks if one context already exists (step 2) and whether it has already received an
acknowledgment (step 3). If both conditions are valid, the connection is established
and both IPsrc and IPdst can be rewritten with the help of the function g and the
information stored in the context. After that, packets continue the standard processing.
If the context does not exist, it has to be created. It will contain the real IP source
address and real IP destination address, as well as the flow label value (step 5). It
moves to step 6, where the context exists but no acknowledgment has been received so
far. AES encryption with K(t) is used to rewrite IP addresses.
Since the rewritten IPsrc is used as a parameter for a reply from the remote network,
it need to be stored (step 7 and step 9). Several addresses can be stored if several
packets are sent before receiving an acknowledgment. The packet follows afterwards
the standard packet processing.
3.3.4 Detailed steps of packets processing (incoming packets)
Figure 3.6 depicts the packet processing for all kinds of packets coming from the co-
operating network or not. Processing of incoming packets begins with the extraction
of the pair (IPsrc, IPdst). The flow label is not extracted, this value cannot be trusted
outside of the local network. This flow label will be rewritten to an internal value to
make the future flow identification of local packets going to the Internet. The goal is to
know whether a context already exists for this connection (step 2 and 3). If this is the
first packet for this context, it is an initialization acknowledgment and the status of the
context has to be changed (step 8). The processing ends with the rewriting of dynam-
ical addresses to stable addresses and the packet is returned for standard processing
(step 6).
If the context does not exist, IP addresses need to be decrypted with the AES
function and K(t) (step 7). This decryption is followed by the computation and the
verification of the transport layer protocol checksum in (step 9). A bad checksum
implies to drop the packet, since it is probably an attempt of an attacker to send a
packet with a spoofed address. If it is valid, a context is initiated (step 10) and the
rewritten packet is returned for standard processing.
3.3.5 Identification of a flow thanks to the flow label field
Our goal is to create an address sequence for each data flow. By flow, is meant a
sequence of packets where information of upper layers is enough for an attacker to
correlate packets with each other and to rebuild the sequence.
The first trivial idea is to make one flow for each pair (IPsrc, IPdst). It does not
take a lot of resources, but does not prevent correlation if more than one flow are sent
between devices. Nevertheless, it can be desirable to obfuscate this information.
IPv6 introduces a new header field to give information about a packet flow: the flow
label field [ACJR11]. It is a 20 bit header, that can be used for Quality of service (QoS)
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Figure 3.5: Processing of outgoing packet (to the Internet).
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Figure 3.6: Processing of incoming packet (from the Internet).
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Figure 3.7: Packet dropping due to latency.
Figure 3.8: Packet dropping due to desynchronization.
or other uses (RFC 6294 [HC11] gives of survey of uses). This flow label can be rewritten
on the communication path, and is not part of the checksum. Because other uses than
QoS are allowed, our proposition respects current standard specifications [ACJR11].
A data flow to spread is defined by the tuple (IPsrc, IPdst, f lowlabel). If the end
device sets a different value for two flows, it will be spread into two different sequences.
The flow label is set by the end device itself, which has enough information to know
whether a packet sequence should be grouped with another connection or not.
3.4 Loss of packets due to desynchronization
3.4.1 Theoretical loss due to false positive detection
Our spreading solution drops packets if they do not follow the address sequences. This
spreading protects against attackers, but valid packets sent by the real device can be
dropped. Because of the latency in the network, when a packet takes too much time
to be transmitted, it will be dropped by the receiver, since it has already switched to
the next addresses pair. This false positive detection is depicted by Figure 3.7.
The second source of problems is the time desynchronization between two spreaders:
if the clocks are not synchronized, a valid packet will be detected as spoofed even when
the sender is not an attacker. In some cases, the packet comes too early, as depicted
by Figure 3.8.
In this section, we describe the theory of this packet loss. We first estimate the
packet loss in case of latency in the network with perfectly synchronized spreaders.
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Second, time desynchronization between spreaders is added. Next, the consequences
for a simple ICMP echo request/echo reply communication are explored. We conclude
with solutions to mitigate both problems.
Latency effect
The latency is the time needed for a packet to go from a source to a destination. The
latency can be less than one millisecond on a local network (LAN), and several seconds
between two points on the Internet. If we assume that the latency is stable for all
packets and is the same in both directions, it is easy to estimate the proportion of the
packet loss. All packets sent at the end of the lifetime of an address will be dropped
by the receiver spreader. The duration of this black hole in the communication is
precisely the value of the latency. Assuming a constant rate of packet emission, the
packet proportion loss is:
loss = latency
lifetime
(3.7)
For example, with a configuration of 1 second for the address lifetime, with 100 ms of
latency for the transmission, 10% of packets will be dropped in both direction between
the spreaders A and B.
Desynchronization effect
It is not easy to perfectly synchronize two computers on the Internet. Even with the
NTP [MMBK10], clocks of computers are not perfect and a little desynchronization
always appears. In one way of the transmission, this desynchronization is good, since
it reduces the observed latency between both computers. In the other direction, the
desynchronization is added to the latency and it implies a longer duration of black hole
for the communication.
Assuming that the spreader A is desynchronized with A later than B, the loss in
the direction A to B is:
lossA→B =
latency + desync
lifetime
(3.8)
In the other direction from B to A, the loss is reduced to:
lossB→A =
|latency − desync|
lifetime
(3.9)
The perfect case in this direction is reached when the latency is equal to the desyn-
chronization: packets are no longer lost in this direction. If the desynchronization is
bigger than the latency, some packets come too early to the spreader A (A has not yet
switched to the following address) and packets are dropped.
With the same configuration of 1 second for address lifetimes, with 100 ms of latency
on the network, and a desynchronization of 10 ms, 11% of packets are dropped between
A and B (110 ms of black hole) and 9% between B and A (90 ms of black hole).
ICMP echo request/echo reply communication
The evaluation of packet loss in both directions is not enough to evaluate the impact
on communications. On the Internet, a unidirectional payload transmission is very
unusual. The most popular protocol TCP sends many acknowledgment packets even
for a unidirectional transmission, and a simple ICMP echo request is replied with an
echo reply packet.
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Figure 3.9: ICMP echo failure rate vs latency.
Packet loss due to address spreading is not distributed like a standard network error
(each packet does not have the same probability of failure), but the connection seems
to be broken for a short duration, in one or two ways.
For example, in case of ICMP echo transmission between spreaders A and B, the
time period over which on echo reply/request packet can be dropped is:
latency ∗ 2 + desync (3.10)
The theoretical ICMP echo request/reply transmission failure is plotted in Fig-
ure 3.9 for a given latency with respect to address lifetime, without any spreader
desynchronization.
Overlapping temporal windows of previous and following addresses
To reduce the packet loss, it is possible to accept the old address of time t − 1 over
a temporal window where both current t and t − 1 addresses are accepted. With
a temporal window larger than the latency, no packets are dropped by synchronized
spreaders.
In case of desynchronization smaller than the latency, this desynchronization du-
ration needs to be added to the temporal windows to accept all packets sent in the
communication. A spreader cannot know whether a packet is delayed due to the la-
tency or due to a desynchronization problem.
If the desynchronization is larger than the latency, a spreader will receive packets
too early. Similarly, a temporal window over which both addresses of t and t+ 1 would
be valid can be used. If a spreader receives many packets on the t + 1 address, it
is a sign of desynchronization and it could help to resynchronize both spreaders. We
present our experimental results on temporal windows to accept previous and following
addresses in Chapter 5.
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3.5 Conclusion on address spreading
Address spreading is an innovative solution to identify a connection. This is a new
mechanism to protect against spoofing attack, using dynamical addresses as identifiers
for the connection. Our spreading protects against connection initialization from an
attacker, as well as packet injection inside an established connection. It provides a
strong protection, without adding extra headers.
We described the full protocol to securely initiate a connection between two spread-
ers, with an initialization of temporal sequences of addresses for each flow. We did a
step by step description of the spreader internal functionality, and we explained the
theoretical packet loss without any temporal windows.
This loss can however be avoided with the use of temporal windows for previous
addresses. This temporal window avoids false positive detection of packets due to
the network latency. Since it is hard to synchronize computers on the Internet, we
propose to add a temporal window for the next address too. It protects against small
desynchronization, like the one two computers synchronized with NTP can experience.
Furthermore, this system can be used to resynchronize spreaders without any external
source of time. Even with the temporal windows, an address is valid only for several
durations of the latency in the network, defeating an attacker attempting to spoof an
address.
Even though there are many existing solutions to avoid IP spoofing, our solution has
advantages on them. First, this protection does not need cooperation of intermediate
AS. It can be deployed by two end networks, without involving of other actors. More-
over, the position of the protection can be chosen by administrators, allowing flexibility
for the local network architecture.
Second, our solution is based on IP headers only. In this class of solution, we are
more secure than identifications using to the Hop Limit fluctuation, based on a 8 bit
field, and which need a learning phase. Moreover, we are compatible with this previous
solution, because we only rewrite the IP addresses.
For the performance, our contribution does not add any packet encapsulation or
external header. This architecture choice does not reduce the network bandwidth, like
IPsec tunnel or the MT6D encapsulation do. Moreover, there is no risk for a middlebox
to misunderstand the additional header.
Since it does not need complex cryptographic computations (a spoofed packet will
be invalidated after one or two AES computations), it can be deployed on devices with
small computation capacity, like a sensor network.
The theoretical work of this chapter is further developed in Chapter 5 with a presen-
tation of experimental results. We compare our prevision of packet loss with empirical
networks, and we evaluate the performances of overlapping temporal windows.
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The flow label field is one of the new features of IPv6. However, it is not really
used in practice, the rather few API implementations to set labels on operating systems
differ considerably In this thesis, flow labels are used to provide flow identification in
the local network. To prove feasibility of this approach, tests of our solution are done
on real operating systems.
In this chapter, Section 4.1 explains the flow label implementation complexity, and
the current requirements to be compliant with IPv6 standards. The current imple-
mentation of the flow label field in IPv6 headers is then described for several popular
operating systems in Section 4.2. Our goal is to provide an overview of the state of the
art for flow label implementation, to simplify future portable applications using flow
labels on several operating systems.
This state of the art is completed with a focus on the Linux Kernel. The Linux
Kernel provides today the most complex flow label API. Details are described in Sec-
tion 4.3, and the reasons of some updates are explained in the same section.
The Linux Kernel has been used for our development and tests, but we realized that
the API was not usable in practice. Our modifications on the Kernel are explained in
Section 4.5. Our contribution contains bug fixes, the removing of some limitations, and
an implementation of new options for the flow label manager. All the modifications
were accepted in the mainstream Vanilla Kernel.
Section 4.6 closes this chapter with a proposition to assign a flow label to each
application on a Linux client. It is the implementation of the idea explained in chapter 2,
allowing to assign a label to each application without patching all of them.
4.1 The lack of standardized API
4.1.1 Historical evolution of RFCs
The idea to introduce a new field for Quality of Service management and flow classifi-
cation came very early in the IPv6 standardization process. The first RFC mentioning
flow labels [Par95] was published in June 1995, six months before the RFC on IPv6
specification [DH95]. The motivation was to allow a classification of IPv6 flow though
IPv6 headers only, to simplify the work done by a router (all packets sharing the same
three element tuple {IP source address, IP destination address, flow label} can have the
same processing, cached after the first packet) or to allow a simple flow identification
without complex parsing of transport protocol headers. Moreover, since the flow label
is set at the network layer, it remains available even in case of IP packet fragmentation.
The label is set for all fragments.
This field has a long history, and specifications have changed several times over the
time. The first update of IPv6 specification [DH98] moved the flow label specification
part in appendix, and reduced the size of flow label from 24 to 20 bits. Since this
specification, basic rules are:
• the flow label is 20 bits long;
• the flow label is not part of the checksum;
• the flow label is not secured by IPsec.
These rules do not prevent the change of the flow label role in future specifications,
but they have a big side effect: flow labels are not secure at all. A transmission error
is enough to deliver a bad flow label to the receiver, without any chance of detection.
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The next specification step occurred in RFC 3697 [RCCD04], in March 2004. It
introduced new rules for nodes wanting a flow label settings, and forbade modifications
of flow labels over the path between the source and the destination nodes.
These rules were recently obsoleted by the RFC 6437 [ACJR11], given some works
on the real use of flow label [HC11] and works on the current specification relevance
[ACJ11].
Thanks or due to all these works, no standardized API for flow label has never been
defined. In the basic socket interface for IPv6 [GTB+03], the sockaddr_in6 C structure
has a member called sin6_flowinfo. It is defined as follows: “The sin6_flowinfo
field is a 32-bit field intended to contain flow-related information. The exact way this
field is mapped to or from a packet is not currently specified”. Specification for this
member is postponed to the future: “The complete definition of the sin6_flowinfo
field, including its association with the traffic class or flow label, is now deferred to a
future specification”. This specification still does not exist today.
In the full featured API for communication between applications and operating
systems for IPv6 sockets defined in RFC 3542 [STNJ03], flow labels are out of the
scope. Flow labels are only referenced for “This API does not define access to the flow
label field, because today there is no standard usage of the field”.
No newer RFCs have even changed it, even though some protocols are on the
RFC standard tracks (old ones [BZB+97] or recent ones [CA11]), or mentioned in
informational RFC like the RFC 7098 [CJT14]. Out of the IETF process, many ways
to use the flow label field are proposed. Nevertheless, the question of how to set a label
on a node is not really in discussion.
4.1.2 Current standardization
Even without defined API, an IPv6 node has to support the RFC 6437. It is a real
problem for operating system developers, since any self-made solution can be obsoleted
in the future, but without it nodes will not follow standard IPv6 specifications.
The current rules that IPv6 nodes have to follow to respect the flow label specifi-
cations are summarized here.
On a terminal node
Even if a node itself does not require any flow-specific treatment, it still has to be able
to set a label on well known flows (for example for TCP connections and application
streams).
The default case is to set all flow labels to zero, i.e. when the node does not assign
specific labels to flows. In case of labeling in a stateless mode, it should assign each
“unrelated transport connection and application data stream to a new flow”.
This becomes more difficult with the vague definition of a flow. When a flow is
“not necessarily 1:1 mapped to a transport connection”, it is yet defined as follows:
“A typical definition of a flow for this purpose is any set of packets carrying the same
5-tuple {dest addr, source addr, protocol, dest port, source port}”. Application and
transport layers were previously in charge of the flow definition in RFC 3697, but it is
not longer specified.
However, the RFC is more verbose on the statistical distribution of flow labels,
which should be an approximation of a discrete uniform distribution. It does not
forbid to set the same label for two flows, as long as it remains a low-probability event.
The flow label assignment in a stateful scenario is not covered by this standard.
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On an intermediate node (router)
Since the RFC 6437, an intermediate node is allowed to rewrite zero flow label values.
It could help to set label for upstream routers, for clients not supporting any labeling.
Rewriting of non-zero values is not allowed, except for sensitive security networks.
4.2 Diversity of implementation on operating systems
Since the implementations specifications is out of scope of the normative references,
each IPv6 stack has its own approach. Whereas a majority of operating systems allows
the setting of a flow label on a client socket (in case of TCP), it is harder to know what
to do with a listening socket. Should each child socket share the same label? Should
each child use the same label as received packets? Or should the operating system set
a new label on each child, different from the received label?
The link between operating system and user space is very hard as well. Should
a software be able to know the current flow label value of a socket? How to set the
same label on several sockets of an application flow? Could applications group sockets,
to allow the sharing of identical labels for all sockets of the group? What about the
knowledge of the received flow label?
It is possible to investigate many features. We restricted our analysis to four major
features:
• How to set a flow label to an outgoing socket?
• How to set a flow label to a listening socket? (if the transport protocol allows
listening sockets)
• How to know the current flow label set to the socket for outgoing packets?
• How to read the flow label of received packet?
The answers to these 4 questions are mandatory to write applications using flow
label. Without knowing how to process flow label on an operating system, it is not pos-
sible to deploy Quality of service (QoS) protocols based on it and new flow classification
methods based on flow labels.
In this section, our results for several operating systems are reported.
4.2.1 The KAME project
The goal of the KAME project was to provide a full featured IPv6 stack for BSD
operating systems, like FreeBSD, OpenBSD and NetBSD. It is one of the most fa-
mous IPv6 implementation, and is deployed in many embedded devices. To test the
implementation of flow labels, we made our tests on FreeBSD 9.0.
Enabling flow labels
The flow label implementation follows specifications defined in an IETF draft [Hag01].
In this specification, the operating system is in charge to randomly set a flow label on
each socket. A software cannot request or set a specified value. The only configuration
option is to disable the flow label for specific sockets. In this case, the flow label is set
to zero.
There is a global default option to disable or enable the flow label on the system. It
is set by the sysctl option net.inet6.ip6.auto_flowlabel. This default configuration
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can be bypassed by the application itself, with the help of the standard setsockopt()
function, with IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL as parameter:
const int off = 0;
const int on = 1;
int s; /* socket */
/* disables automatic flow label */
setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL, &off, sizeof(off));
/* enables automatic flow label */
setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL, &on, sizeof(on));
This option has to be set before the beginning of the data transmission, and cannot be
changed over the connection lifetime. It works for TCP and UDP sockets.
For listening sockets, the operating system randomly sets in the same way flow
labels. It means that each child of a TCP listening socket will have a different flow
label value, regardless of the label received.
Read the flow label value
To read the flow label value set by the kernel, the draft tells to call the function
getsockname():
struct sockaddr_in6 src;
int s; /* socket */
socklen_t slen;
/* obtain the flow label value */
slen = sizeof(src);
getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *)&src, &slen);
printf("flowlabel=%x\n",
ntohl(src.sin6_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK));
Though in practice, it does not work (the returned value is always zero), and a look
at the kfreebsd code confirms that the flow label is not returned with a getsockname().
To read the received flow label, both implementation and the draft are consistent: it is
not possible.
4.2.2 Flow label to Solaris
To test the flow label status on Solaris, we used the last development version of OpenIn-
diana, a OpenSource version of Solaris 10.
On this system, the field sin6_flowinfo defined in RFC 3493 is used for the
sockaddr_in6 C structure. For an outgoing socket, an application can set the field
sin6_flowinfo with a flow label. Since the sin6_flowinfo can contain the Traffic
Class, a mask has to be applied to the flow label value (0xFFFFF is the hexadecimal
value of the last 20 bits of the field):
int s; /* socket */
int label; /* the flow label value */
struct sockaddr_in6 dst;
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dst.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
dst.sin6_port = port;
dst.sin6_flowinfo = htonl(label &0xFFFFF);
connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr*) &dst, sizeof(dst))
The code works for UDP and TCP protocols, as well as ICMP.
During our tests, we have not found any way to read the flow label set by applica-
tions or to read the flow label received from a remote server. For listening sockets, no
solution is implemented to set a flow label.
4.2.3 MAC OS X
Even though the Kernel of MAC OS X has a network stack based on the BSD system,
and that the IPv6 stack comes from the KAME project, the implementation of flow
labels is slightly different on Mac OS X.. Tests are run on the versions 10.6, 10.8 and
10.9 of MAC OS X.
We notice an evolution on the flow label implementation, confirmed by the available
code of the Darwin Kernel (the OpenSource part of MAC OS X).
Version 10.6
On the version 10.6 of MAC OS X, the C code above used to set a flow label on Solaris
works, in a client mode. Without any configuration, the flow label of a TCP connection
is always zero.
The behavior is not the same with the UDP protocol. The same sysctl entry as
on BSD systems is available. The net.inet6.ip6.auto_flowlabel automatically con-
trols flow label assignment for UDP. This assignment is very simple: it follows incremen-
tal values, allowing someone outside the network to know the number of connections
used by a computer. Individual configuration is not possible to configure sockets, the
IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL option always returns an error.
Version 10.8
On the version 10.8 of MAC OS X, the flow label assignment for TCP sockets is the
same as the version 10.6. However, the IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL does not return an error
anymore, but is simply ignored by the operating system.
On the UDP socket, it is now allowed to disable or enable the auto-assignment of a
label with the IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL option. The label values still follow an incremental
sequence.
Version 10.9
On the version 10.9, of MAC OS X, flow label implementation is a mix between the
BSD auto assignment solution and the one per application manual assignment of Solaris.
First, the net.inet6.ip6.auto_flowlabel sysctl and the IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL socket
option are available. They work both on UDP and TCP sockets.
Furthermore, is is now possible on a TCP socket to manually set a label with the
sin6_flowinfo, with the same code as with Solaris. The developer of an application
can choose between three alternatives to manage flow labels on MAC OS X:
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Version IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL sin6_flowinfo Both enabled
10.6 Return an error Works ∅
10.8 Ignored but no error Works ∅
10.9 Works, with a randomvalue Works
Priority of
sin6_flowinfo
Table 4.1: TCP flow label behavior on MAC OS X (versions 10.6, 10.8 and 10.9).
• Let the Kernel take a random value;
• Manually set a non-zero value;
• Disable the automatic setting and do no set a value to get a zero flow label.
For listening socket, only the Kernel random value is available. We have not yet found
any solution to read the label allocated by the Kernel and to read the received flow
label value.
Comparison of MAC OS X versions
The TCP client behavior on MAC OS X is summarized in Table 4.1. The auto-
assignment of labels did not work before the version 10.9, but an individual config-
uration like on Solaris is allowed. This configuration has the priority on the random
value assigned by the Kernel on the version 10.9.
Results on a listening socket are not listed in the table, since it only works for MAC
OS X 10.9 with an auto-assignment.
The behavior for UDP sockets differ considerably from TCP sockets, as summa-
rized by table 4.2. First, the sin6_flowinfo field is always ignored. Second, it is
always possible to automatically assign a flow label with the Kernel. On the version
10.6, only a global configuration is possible with the sysctl. On the version 10.8, the
IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL option works. On the 10.9, the auto-assignment returns a ran-
dom value, in accordance with RFC rules.
Version IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL sin6_flowinfo
10.6 Return an error, but sysctl works.Incremental assignment. Ignored
10.8 Works. Incremental assignment. Ignored
10.9 Works. Random value. Ignored
Table 4.2: UDP flow label behavior on MAC OS X.
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4.2.4 No flow label on Microsoft Windows
The IPv6 API is very restricted on Microsoft Windows, and many standardized options
are not available. We ran tests on Windows 7 and Windows 8, without any success
to set or read a flow label on a socket. Since these features are not documented, it is
likely not possible at all.
4.2.5 Comparison of operating system implementations
To summarize our results, Table 4.3 depicts the capacity to set a flow label on an
operating system. On BSD and MAC OS X, the Kernel can randomly set a flow label
value whereas applications ask for it. On Solaris and MAC OS X, an application can
freely set an arbitrary value, even if another application already uses it. On the MAC
OS X, the manual setting has the priority on the random value.
Operating sys-
tem
Flow label for outgoing
sockets
Flow label for listening
sockets
BSD/KAME Yes (Kernel) Yes (Kernel)
Solaris Yes (flowinfo field) No
MAC OS X Yes (Kernel and flowinfo) Yes (Kernel)
Windows No No
Table 4.3: Socket labelling on various operating systems.
We tried to read flow label sent and received by TCP socket. It is currently not
possible on the majority of operating systems, except for Linux that we describe in the
next sections.
4.3 Need of the Linux API refactoring
4.3.1 Historical implementation on the Linux Kernel
The flow label implementation on Linux was released in the version 2.2.7, in April
1999. Implementation choices are documented in the current iproute documentation
[Ale99]. Between 1999 and 2013, no real change has been made on this API, only some
small internal refactoring.
4.3.2 Principles of the implementation
The implementation is based on a new socket option IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR of the stan-
dard setsockopt() function. IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR takes as argument a C structure
named in6_flowlabel_req, allowing to pass many configuration options. This imple-
mentation is based on the cooperation between the userspace (passing options, request-
ing options, etc) and the Kernel, managing the flow label assignment.
This option itself is not enough to send packet with a flow label. After requesting
a label, the application has to enable the option IPV6_FLOWINFO_SEND.
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To read the current label, there is no easy way. All allocated flow labels are displayed
in the /proc/net/ip6_flowlabel special file, but it implies parsing the file to read the
information. Moreover, it is impossible to know whether an allocated label is set on a
specific socket, or to another one.
4.3.3 Sharing and permission system
The Linux implementation provides means to set some permissions in a label. The
process owning a flow label can share it with everyone, or restrict the sharing with all
sockets of the process, or with processes of the user. Of course, the sharing can be fully
disabled.
4.3.4 The current implementation in details
The in6_flowlabel_req structure is defined as follows:
struct in6_flowlabel_req
{
struct in6_addr flr_dst;
__u32 flr_label;
__u8 flr_action;
__u8 flr_share;
__u16 flr_flags;
__u16 flr_expires;
__u16 flr_linger;
__u32 __flr_reserved;
};
The first important member is the variable flr_action, which is used to set the
requested action. Three different actions are possible: get a flow label (flow label
request to the kernel), renew a flow label, or release a flow label. The get action can
be completed by flags assigned in the flr_flags member. The flags can request the
creation a new flow label, or ask for an already allocated label.
For the get action, flr_label can be set to a desired value, or to zero. In case of
zero, the kernel will automatically assign a label.
The flr_share is here to allow or restrict sharing of label. Four options are possible:
• IPV6_FL_S_EXCL: this label is private (only for this socket);
• IPV6_FL_S_PROCESS: share this label with other sockets opened by the process;
• IPV6_FL_S_USER: all processes of the user can use this label;
• IPV6_FL_S_ANY: everyone is allowed to reuse this label.
The members flr_expires and flr_linger are used to set the label lifetime. A
label will never be released while a socket is using it. Nevertheless, if nobody uses it
anymore, the flr_expires is the minimum label lifetime, and the label will never be
destroyed before this time (in seconds), even if all sockets that used it are closed.
The linger is the time (in seconds) before allowing a socket to reuse a flow label.
Both timers are restricted to 60 seconds by default for users.
In conclusion, this API is not simple, but allows a variety of flow label applications.
The Linux Kernel is the only operating system allowing a system of permissions for flow
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labels. This permission system is not trivial: it supports several sharing modes and a
reservation time before reusing of a flow label. At the end, since the Linux Kernel is
an Open Source project, this API can be extended for research purpose and to develop
new applications based on flow label.
4.4 Limitations of the Linux Kernel API
Even though the Linux flow label API seems to be more complex than APIs of other
operating systems, there were some bugs and limitations. Most of them are historical:
the flow label definition was not the same in 1999 as today.
4.4.1 Restrictions incompatible with RFCs
Since Linux followed the rules of the RFC 1809, there were strong restrictions:
• One label is only valid for one destination. Even with sharing enabled, one label
cannot be sent to more than one IPv6 destination address.
• All sockets of a label have to share the same set of IPv6 extension headers;
• The lifetime of a label is very short. A standard user cannot request a label for
more than 60 + 60 = 120 seconds.
4.4.2 Lack of options in flow label Management
The flow label setting is fully featured, with many configuration options. However,
after the initial setting, a software cannot follow the status of a label without parsing
a special file. If the Kernel randomly assigns flow labels, it is even not possible to
know the label in use Similarly, how should an application renew a label, without any
knowledge of the label lifetime?
Though it is theoretically possible to read incoming flow labels, it is not standardized
for all protocols. Moreover, the implementation was bugged in some situation for the
TCP protocol.
4.5 Modifications on the Kernel
All contributions described here are accepted and released in the version 3.13 and 3.14
of the Linux Kernel.
4.5.1 Removing old restrictions
We first removed the condition on the destination on the Linux Kernel API. With the
current kernel, it is now possible to send one label value to more than one destination.
It is very useful in case of label sharing for a user or an application. Many application
flows indeed use more than one IP destination.
Second, we removed the obsolete condition on IPv6 extension headers. The rule that
all packets sharing a flow label have to share the same extension headers is obsolete.
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4.5.2 Adding options to read flow label
Sent flow label
To read the flow label assigned to a socket, we built a call with the function getsockopt.
This reading is useful in some cases, for example when a software asks for a random flow
label value to the kernels, but needs the value for future internal sharing. Similarly, an
application needs to know the status of the label lifetime to renew it.
This new call follows the API defined for setsockopt(). The option name is
IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR, and takes as argument a pointer to a C structure1. The Kernel
returns all label status in the following order:
• the flow label value assigned to the socket;
• the sharing permission of this label;
• the expire time left and the linger timer.
The only information available in the /proc file and not retrieved here is the identity
of the label owner. The following code reads the flow label information and prints it to
the user.
int s; /* socket */
struct in6_flowlabel_req freq;
int size = sizeof(freq);
freq.flr_action = IPV6_FL_A_GET;
getsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR, &freq, &size);
printf("Label %05X share %d expires %d linger %d\n",
ntohl(flowstruct2.flr_label),
freq.flr_share,
freq.flr_linger,
freq.flr_expires);
It returns the following results:
Label 03707 share 255 linger 6 expires 59
For comparison, the /proc/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel file gives the following informa-
tion:
Label S Owner Users Linger Expires
03707 255 0 1 6 59
The software is now able to read the flow label information and to take decisions based
on it.
1The structure is named in6_flowlabel_req.
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Flow label received
To read the received flow label, we extended our work with getsockopt() function.
The user can set the flag IPV6_FL_F_REMOTE to get the received flow label value. Of
course, it does not contain any other information like the expire value, because they do
not make sens locally.
It was actually possible to get this information via the option RECV_FLOWINFO spec-
ified in the RFC 2292 [ST98]. However, it is not so easy to because of the answer
complexity, second, it was not consistent with the concept of flow label manager to
read/set flow labels, and third is was bugged for some TCP states (the returned value
was zero, and not the received flow label).
4.5.3 The reflecting option
In case of a stateful identification of flows based on flow label, it is a good feature that
IP packets of a flow share the same label in both directions. Indeed, protocols like TCP
send packets in both directions by nature, even if the payload is unidirectional. It was
not possible to implement it in the userspace with the Linux kernel API, because some
information is obfuscated to the userspace. For example, at the connection initializa-
tion, a listening socket can read the received flow label only after the internal Kernel
processing for the TCP SYN/ACK packets. It is then too late to set the flow label on
the SYN-ACK packet.
Description of the reflect mode
To achieve an early setting of the flow label, an implementation in the kernel is required.
Our goal was to make all packets of a flow received and sent on a listening socket sharing
the same flow label in both directions. It includes packets used for the initialization
process and all TCP states, even for half closed sockets. Of course, this functionality is
not limited to the TCP protocol. However, it could be implemented for UDP protocols
in userspace before this new option.
To be consistent with the flow label API, a configuration flag for a flow label request
has been added. With the IPV6_FL_A_GET action, an application can set the flag
IPV6_FL_F_REFLECT.
Uniqueness in the flow label manager
In the behavior of the previous Linux Kernel, flow labels are unique. It allows granular
permission management, but it triggers a problem for the reflect mode. Indeed, if a
socket receives a flow label already set, reserved by a socket, what can the kernel do?
Setting a flow label according to the received flow label value allows someone outside
the system to set arbitrary values.
Not to break applications based on the permissions of the current API, we added a
sysctl variable to bypass the restriction. This variable can be set or read with the sysctl
command, or with the special file /proc/sys/net/ipv6/flowlabel_consistency.
Difficulties on TCP
TCP is a complex protocol with many states. The Kernel implementation has to follow
all these states, but at the same time, it has to optimize the memory and processor
consumption.
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This is why some states have a special structure and not the same as an established
connection. The structure stores less information than the real one, reducing the mem-
ory pressure. The first state, which has a special structure, is of course the listening
socket after the first reception of a SYN. To reflect the flow label received, the value
cannot be stored in the listening socket structure, since the listening socket may have
other children in case of simultaneous connections.
The only way is to store the flow label information in the inet_request_sock
structure. This structure can store the header received in the first SYN segment. It is
then possible to read the flow label sent with the SYN/ACK packet.
The second special case is the TIME_WAIT state. This state is reached by the end
device closing the connection first. It allows the socket to be sure that the port will
not be reused by another application for a short time, and to send acknowledgment to
the last received packets (like the ACK of the FIN/ACK sent by the remote device).
It appeared during our tests that flow labels are not stored in the TIME_WAIT state,
and that packets sent in this state are not consistent with the flow label set by the
application. To fix it, we replaced some padding available in the inet_timewait_sock
structure. The flow label value sets by the application (or by the received packet in the
reflect mode) is stored, and the stored value is read to send ACK when needed. Since
this padding was unused, not memory overhead is added on sockets.
4.6 Preload library
The solution presented in Chapter 2 is based on the flow differentiation to flow labels.
The best way to achieve it is to patch each software, allowing a very fine granularity of
flow label management.
However, it is not realistic to hope this major change on all software. It could be
easy to patch popular2 software like the Firefox browser to set a label to each navigation
tab, but there are too many applications to scale this solution.
To use the benefits of our solution without major change, we propose a solution to
set automatically one label to each software. It will not break any application layer
protocols, and it is sufficient to separate various activities of one user into several flows.
4.6.1 Preloading the library on dynamically compiled software
The call to the connect() function can be intercepted. It allows to check whether a
flow label is already set and to continue with the standard function connect() if it
is the case. Otherwise, the flow label can be enabled and a value (derived from the
process identifier PID, and a random value generated at each system startup time) via
the setsockopt() function.
Using this approach, patching every application is not needed to use spreading.
At the same time, it does not interfere with a patched application since it does not
overwrite an existing flow label value. Even if this is not an optimal solution, the gain
is high in comparison with using just one address for all applications running on a given
computer.
4.6.2 Implementation and installation of the library
Figure 4.1 depicts the internal process of the preload library. After the interception
of the connect() call, it first checks whether the socket is an IPv6 socket. If not, it
2and critical in term of privacy, since a browser allows many various usages.
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Figure 4.1: Features of the preload library.
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Figure 4.2: Time to run 20.000 tests with library preload enabled/disabled.
returns immediately the real connect() function.
The second step is to check whether the user has disabled the library. Indeed, a
user can set an environment variable to disable the auto-configuration of a label if the
software does not need to have one. It is complementary with the next step, when
the library checks if a label is already assigned to a non-zero value. In both cases, the
preload library does not correct user’s wish and returns the real connect() function.
Otherwise, the library assigns a label to the socket, thanks to the IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR
option for setsockopt(). The assigned value is unique for each PID and sharing is
only allowed within the same process.
4.6.3 Evaluation of the library performance
A potential latency cost comes from the library preload, that assigns a flow label to
each application. Our tests were done on a virtual machine with a 2.4Ghz CPU. We
ran 20.000 times four different tests:
• open and read a short file, with library preload disabled;
• the same command, but with library preload enabled;
• a short netcat command, sending an UDP datagram to localhost and quitting,
without library preload;
• the same netcat command, with library preload enabled.
Figure 4.2 shows the measured times for the 20.000 iterations.
The difference of time spent for the two first test (opening and reading with and
without the preload library) comes from the load of the library at the startup, even
though the library does nothing. It introduces an average a latency of 5.10−5 seconds
but only at the startup of the software (the library has to be loaded only once). The
difference between the two netcat tests reveals the total overhead of the library, time
to set up the flow label included. Taking the loading time away, the average latency
overhead is 9.10−6 seconds for each connection, Kernel time included.
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As expected, our preload library does not have significant influence on the overall
latency.
4.7 Conclusion on the flow labels implementation
Since there is no standard to define how operating systems should manage flow label
assignement and no API defined to communicate between applications and operating
systems, different implementations coexist. Some operating systems do not control flow
label assignement at all, sending packets with always a zero value. In contrast, Linux is
an operating system with a flow label manager allowing complex interactions between
the operating system and the applications.
Our work on Linux makes it more usable and add several options. These options
were needed for our work to provide flow identification inside thlocal networks. The IP
address obfuscation describes in Chapter 2 cannot work without flow label assignment,
or with bugged implementation like in the Linux Kernel versions prior to the 3.13.
To help the deployment of our solution, we proposed a preload library, which cannot
work checking whether flow labels are already assigned or not. The reading feature
is mandatory for it. Additionnaly, the reflect mode can be useful for the spreading
proposed in Chapter 3.
However, our work on flow labels is not specific to address spreading. Basic function-
alities like reading the current assigned flow label, the received flow label, or replying
with the same label are likely to be useful for other applications. For example, the
proposition to secure TCP connections [Bla09] needs to read incoming labels. Another
example is the proposition [SMNA98] with the RSVP protocol, which implies that the
application can read the outgoing flow label assigned to a socket. We hope that the cur-
rent implementation on Linux Kernel can help to test and deploy innovative solutions
based on the flow label field.
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IPv6 address spreading described in Chapter 3 is an innovative solution to protect
against address spoofing. The above chapter explained the theoretical aspects of the
contribution, with an evaluation of the packet loss and a solution to reduce this loss
thanks to overlapping temporal windows.
In this chapter, address spreading performances are measured on real networks.
This evaluation is based on based on a Netfilter module for Linux, following the steps
explained in section 3.3.3. The implementation supports the configuration of both the
address validity lifetime and temporal windows for packets out of the current time
sequence.
Section 5.1 describes the test plateforms and the spreading consequences. It is
followed by a test of the address spreading, without any overlapping window. Results
are compared with theoretical estimations of chapter 3. This evaluation ends with an
evaluation of overlapping window efficiency to reduce packet loss. Both backward and
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Figure 5.1: Performance of RTT for UDP echo requests on the LAN.
forward overlapping windows are tested. A proposition of configuration to avoid any
packet loss closes this section.
The encryption and decryption costs of the AES is considered in Section 5.2. The
following section describes a way to resynchronize spreaders, thanks to overlapping
windows. It is an efficient way to quickly counterbalance this desynchronization and
avoid more packet loss.
An evaluation of address spreading to protect an IPsec tunnel closes this chapter.
5.1 Evaluation of packet loss
5.1.1 Test beds
Several experimentations have be done on several test beds and this chapter presents
results for two of them. The first test bed is an ideal case: a LAN. The typical round-
trip delay time (RTT), measuring the time for a short bidirectionnal communication, is
around 2 milliseconds (ms). Packets are neither lost or desequenced. Figure 5.1 shows
the cumulative distribution function of the RTT.
The second test bed is between a server in Germany using a 6to4 tunnel and a
server with native IPv6 connectivity in France. The network is of poor quality: natural
packet loss is about 1% and desequencing reaches about 0.5% on high network load. In
the preliminary tests, the 6to4 tunnel was less congested at night. Tests were chosen
to run at night to be less concerned by random congestion issues. Figure 5.2 shows the
cumulative distribution function of the RTT.
All devices of the networks are time synchronized on the same Network Time Pro-
tocol (NTP) server. It does not, however, provide perfect synchronization.
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Figure 5.2: Performance of RTT of UDP echo requests on the 6to4 network.
5.1.2 Spreading consequences
Tests description
To evaluate the address spreading performances, three tests have been run on each
network. The first one sends a standard UDP echo packet. It provides a good evaluation
of the network quality for packet loss and latency. The second one is a simple TCP
handshake initialization, without data transfer. The last one is a TCP connection
with data transfer (65 535 bytes). Because TCP is the most popular protocol on the
Internet [ZDJC09] and the test involves data transfer, it is the best test to evaluate the
user experience on a network with spreading. A timeout of 4 seconds is set on both
TCP tests, after which the connection is considered as lost.
Simple spreading
Because of the imperfect computer synchronization and of the network latency, address
spreading implies some packet loss, deteriorating network quality. As a first approach,
a lifetime of one second is set for each address, without any backward or forward
overlapping time windows. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 respectively show the results on the
LAN and the 6to4 network.
On the LAN, UDP packet are never lost when adress are not spread. When spread,
the percentage of failures is around 4%. As UDP does not retransmit in case of loss,
the data transmission will never reach 100% of success even at long times.
For their part, the TCP handshake needs three packets to be completed and the
connection establishment time of most TCP connections is consistent with the UDP
test (three times larger). Some openings are delayed and become successfully completed
with retransmission. Those can be seen on Figure 5.4 for the 6to4 network but not on
Figure 5.3 because of the reduced graphic window.
On the 6to4 network, packet loss has big effects on TCP performance. During
the connection opening, the noticeable steps correspond to the standard time of Linux
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Figure 5.3: Performance impact of a simple spreading on the LAN for UDP and TCP
communications (1 second of address lifetime when spreading is enabled).
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Figure 5.4: Performance impact of a simple spreading on the 6to4 network for UDP
and TCP communications (1 second of address lifetime when spreading is enabled).
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Packet losses
Address lifetime LAN 6to4
50 ms 51% 100%
75 ms 13.2% 60%
100 ms 10% 48.8%
150 ms 9.7% 36.5%
200 ms 5.7% 28%
300 ms 3.9% 20.4%
500 ms 1.3% 14.3%
750 ms 1.1% 8.7%
1000 ms 0.3% 6.8%
2000 ms 0.1% 5.1%
Table 5.1: Proportion of packet loss with respect the adress lifetime on the LAN and
the 6to4 network with UDP protocol.
retransmission strategy for TCP.
High frequency addresses switching
Obviously, the adress lifetime has a big impact on the connection quality. Lifetime
duration between 50 ms and 2 seconds have be tried and the percentage of packet loss
is summarized in Table 5.1.
Figure 5.5 presents the comparison between these empirical results and the theoret-
ical calculations of Section 3.4.1. For the 6to4 network, the typical latency is around
21 ms and a desynchronization of 8 ms was measured at the end of the experiment.
These values give theoretically around 50 ms of transmission black hole. Experimental
results are very close to this prediction. Nevertheless, since the 6to4 network looses
some packets on its own, more failure than expected is observed as the spreading effect
decreases.
On the LAN, the latency is approximately zero and desynchronization is the main
issue. A desynchronization between 0 and 30 ms is measured, varying a lot during ex-
perimentations. An average value was taken to plot theoretical predictions and desyn-
chronization produces a transmission black hole of 17 ms for each address switching.
5.1.3 Backward temporal windows for delayed packets
To prevent delayed packet loss, an overlapping temporal window can be used to accept
packets identified with the previous address (see Figure 5.6). Over the temporal window
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Figure 5.5: Empirical measurement and theoritical predictions of the proportion of
failed ICMP echo transmission. l is the latency on 6to4 network, d the desynchroniza-
tion on the LAN.
Figure 5.6: Temporal window for the previous address, solving the latency issue.
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Figure 5.7: Performance impact of the backward overlapping window duration with
TCP data transmission on the 6to4 network (address lifetime is one second).
duration, both previous and current addresses of the sequence are accepted by the
spreader. This technique is very efficient to decrease packet loss on the 6to4 network,
as shown by Figure 5.7. With a temporal window larger than the sum of the network
latency and the desynchronization, the same performance as without spreading are
obtained.
As depicted in Figure 5.8, it is, however, not enough to fully prevent packet loss on
the LAN. Desynchronization is larger than latency and some packets arrive too early
to the receiving spreader. In this case, the receiving spreader would have to accept the
following address as well as the current one in order to avoid packet loss.
5.1.4 Forward temporal window to avoid desynchronization packet
loss
To solve the desynchronization problem on the LAN and in general, an overlapping
temporal window has been added to accept the future address (see Figure 5.9). Over the
temporal window duration, both current and next following addresses of the sequence
are accepted by the spreader. The results of UDP tests on the LAN are plotted in
Figure 5.10, with an address lifetime of 200 ms and a backward temporal windows for
previous addresses of 60 ms.
Even if there is no latency, adding a sole forward temporal window accepting the
following address is, however, not enough to fully avoid packet loss. The early spreader
also has to accept the previous address, the same way as for packets arriving late because
of latency (see Figure 5.11). Table 5.2 presents packet loss on the LAN with respect
of both temporal window durations for previous and following addresses. Because of
desynchronization fluctuations, some values can be confusing with decreasing loss with
increasing temporal window durations. However, when both forward and backward
temporal windows are larger than desynchronization, packet loss is sucessfully avoided.
A value of 64 milliseconds for both window durations is enough here.
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Figure 5.8: Performance impact of the backward overlapping window duration with
UDP data transmission on the LAN (address lifetime is one second).
Figure 5.9: Temporal window for the following address, solving the desynchronization
issue.
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Figure 5.10: Performance impact of the forward overlapping window duration with
UDP data transmission on the LAN (address lifetime is one second).
Figure 5.11: In case of desynchronization, the following address temporal window is
not enough.
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Table 5.2: Influence of forward and backward temporal window duration on packet
loss, in case of desynchronization (UDP on LAN).
5.1.5 Configuration requirement to fully avoid packet loss
The optimal spreading configuration depends on the network quality between both
spreaders. To fully avoid packet loss, the minimum temporal window duration for
accepting the previous address is equal to the sum connection latency and desynchro-
nization (see Figure 5.12). This value is not always stable, but the order of magnitude
could be estimated by network administrators. Between two networks with a good
Internet connectivity, latency is never more than 500 milliseconds.
The second packet loss source is clock desynchronization between spreaders. If
they are synchronized with the NTP, desynchronization should remain low and the
forward temporal window accepting the following address can last very shortly, less
than 100 milliseconds. Since the configuration of a forward temporal window is most
useful in case of desynchronization larger than latency, this desynchronization should
be detected, as explained in the next Section.
5.2 AES encryption cost
Because of the AES popularity, hardware optimization have very often been imple-
mented for AES computations. With a recent Linux Kernel (version 3.10), a standard
i5 Intel CPU at 2.4 Ghz is able to compute 2.6 millions AES computations (128 bit key
with 16 byte blocks) per second.
As for the middlebox evaluation in section 2.4.3, performances of AES encryption
have been evaluated with the OProfile tool. Tests show that the AES computation at
the connection initialization marginally slows down the overall transmission in compar-
ison with the packet processing.
5.3 Automatic resynchronization
5.3.1 Detection of desynchronization
Even with a perfect synchronization at the beginning of a communication, clocks of
both spreaders can quickly desynchronize. This desynchronization can be detected
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Figure 5.12: Perfect configuration of spreaders, avoiding any packet loss.
thanks to temporal windows.
The number of late packets (sent with a previous adress) is not useful to assess
desynchronization. Indeed, packets can be temporally delayed in the network, because
of latency, without any clock desynchronization between spreaders. Information about
early packets (sent with a future address) is therefore more meaningful. Their presence
implies a larger desynchronization than latency and can be detected by one of the
spreaders.
This is why a spreader detecting a large number of early packets (according to the
local clock) should adjust the connection configuration to change the clock used for the
adress computation ahead. This adjustment is done by adding a small difference to the
internal computer clock. With the Linux implementation, the standard time unit is a
jiffy, used for measuring the time since the system start. The value of a jiffy duration
is not absolute and depends on the compilation options.
5.3.2 Rules for resynchronization
The standard address spreading implementation is modified to test resynchronization.
The implementation proceeds the following way:
1. Data is collected over ten lifetimes of the spread address. With an address spread
every 100 milliseconds, data will be collected for a second. Collected data includes
the count of periods with at least one early packet, the total number of early
packets and the total of received packets;
2. If at least two spread addresses are received to early over a data collection period,
the proportion of early packets of this period is computed;
3. If this proportion is larger than a defined threshold, the clock is adjusted by one
jiffy. In a first stage, the threshold is set to 5%.
4. Counters are reset before to next iteratation of data collection.
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A data collection period is needed to assess the presence of desynchronization. The
second step is here to avoid to change time because of only one early packet, whose
presence could be the sign of just a successful spoofing attempt or a short network
latency variation. The third rule shares the same goal, the amount of received packets
in advance has to be large enough to justify a clock adjustment. The value can be
configured by the administrator.
Since this desynchronization may only be temporary, a rule is added to reverse
the internal change. If no packet are received in advance for ten periods, the clock is
delayed by one jiffy (if an adjustment is active).
5.3.3 Implementation and tests
To test the resynchronization proposition, a time synchronization is first forced between
spreaders. They synchronize their clocks with the same NTP server, before starting
the tests.
A connection is then initialized and a constant flow rate of packets is sent. The the
threshold defined in the third step is set to 5%, meaning that the clock will be adjusted
if more than 5% of packets come too early for the local clock.
In this test, the adress lifetime is set to 400 milliseconds. The backward overlapping
temporal windows for late packets has a duration of 200 milliseconds. This value is
arbitrary high to avoid any packet loss because of latency. Tests have be run on the
LAN, with a very good performance and a low latency. Above tests showed that
desynchronization has a major effect on this test bed.
Using a NTP server to provide synchronization
The synchronization forced at the test beginning is approximately perfect. After this
synchronization, a NTP daemon runs during the test, without the option to force
synchronization for very small differences with the reference server (this is the default
configuration for a NTP daemon). Desynchronization rapidly appears after several
minutes. Without any forward overlapping window accepting the following address,
the first packet loss is detected.
However, the packet loss is never very high, even without our resynchronization
mechanism, as shown on Figure 5.13. On this figure, the red plain curve corresponds
to tests without the resynchronization mechanism. The NTP daemon avoids larger
desynchronization and loss.
Since the packet rate is constant, the 5% threshold is only reached when the for-
ward overlapping temporal window last more than 20 milliseconds, equal to 5% of the
400 milliseconds. In that case, the resynchronization mechanism starts to adjust the
clock before the first packet loss and the connection is perfectly preserved. For tempo-
ral windows smaller than 20 milliseconds, the 5% rule is never reached before a NTP
resynchronization occurs. The packet loss is reduce, thanks to the mechanism presented
in section 5.1. Note that in the above section, the loss rate is equal to zero when the
temporal windows is actually larger than the NTP tolerance.
If the threshold is reduced to smaller values, packet loss can be fully avoided. This
auto-configuration provides a better security than a configuration larger than the NTP
tolerance, since the temporal windows are shorter.
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Figure 5.13: Packet loss with internal resynchronization and a NTP daemon running.
With respect to the forward temporal window address lifetime.
Disabling the NTP server after initialization
Without using NTP over the connection duration, internal resynchronization is manda-
tory. Indeed, after a while, both spreaders can be completely desynchronized and all
packets are then lost. The dashed blue curve on Figure 5.14 depicts this case. After
50 minutes, both networks can no longer communicate.
As with NTP, a value of 24 milliseconds is enough to match the 5% rule and to
fully synchronize spreaders, without any packet loss. For smaller values of the temporal
window, resynchronization only works with a big rate of packet loss (loss reduces the
amount of accepted packets, and increases the proportion of early packets).
The 5% rule is, of course, an arbitrary value. With a smaller value, a shorter
temporal windows will be enough to match the rule and to provide synchronization
without any packet loss. However, experimentation showed that this is a good rule of
thumb.
5.3.4 Limitation of detection and resynchronization
This synchronization method, based on the traffic received by both spreaders, suffers
from some limitations. The first obvious one is that synchronization only works with a
minimum traffic between both spreaders. If the networks do not send any real traffic,
spreaders have to send dummy packets to provide synchronization.
The second limitation happens with a brutal resynchronization of a system clock, for
example by a manual command of an administrator. The internal adjustment cannot
detect it and could break the connection.
5.4 Benefits of address spreading with IPsec
IPsec is the standard and widely deployed protocol to provide security at the IP layer. It
supports many features, like communication authentication, packet payload encryption,
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Figure 5.14: Packet loss with internal resynchronization, without any NTP daemon.
With respect to the forward overlapping temporal window address lifetime.
session negotiation at the beginning of a transmission, etc. It works in a transport mode
(securing a communication between two hosts) as well as in a tunnel mode, securing
communication between two networks by encapsulating packets sent by hosts.
However, the strength of IPsec can sometimes be a weakness: since packet authen-
tication happens close to the communication end, it is impossible to filter packets on an
upstream firewall. It introduces a risk of denial of service, by consuming CPU resource
of the IPsec device (due to CPU computations required for validating IPsec packets)
or by consuming all the available bandwidth. The problem cannot be solved by design
without delegating security to an upstream device, which can be a problem for many
networks.
In this section, address spreading is evaluated to provide authentication of IPsec
flows. Address spreading is done with an additional key, which the IPsec device can
send to upstream firewalls.
5.4.1 Identification of IPsec flows
IPsec packets contains the standard IP headers and one additional header, in order to
choose between one Authentication Header (AH) [Ken05a] or one Encapsulating Secu-
rity Payload (ESP) [Ken05b]. The first step of the flow identification requires the two
source and destination addresses and a Security Parameters Index (SPI). Only packets
matching a context with this triplet will be transmitted for cryptographic computation.
This flow identification before the cryptographic computation is weak: IP addresses
are easy to know for an attacker and the SPI is only 32 bits long. An attacker out of
the communication path can guess the SPI value and an attacker on the path can send
packets with valid SPI.
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CPU on
IPsec receiver
IPsec tunnel
performance
CPU on
firewall
No attack
No spreading 20% 95 Mb/s ∅
Spreading 20% 95 Mb/s 4%
Attack of 1000 pps No spreading 18% 84 Mb/s ∅
No SPI Spreading 20% 95 Mb/s 5.5%
Attack of 3000 pps No spreading 14% 60 Mb/s ∅
No SPI Spreading 20% 95 Mb/s 8%
Attack of 1000 pps No spreading 19% 84 Mb/s ∅
With SPI Spreading 20% 95 Mb/s 5.5%
Table 5.3: Performance of IPsec spreading within a LAN.
5.4.2 Spreading to protect IPsec devices
Addresses of the IPsec flow can be spread to provide IPsec filtering. The use of IPsec
solves the secret exchange problem, because it can be done during the session opening
with an extension of the IKEv2 protocol [KHNE10]. The two IPsec devices will spread
the IPsec session thanks to this secret and will send this secret to upstream firewalls.
With our solution, firewalls will not be able to send valid IPsec packets or to read
the encrypted data: they do not have the key. There are though able to follow the
sequence of IP addresses and to filter invalid packets. It provides additional security,
without compromising basic security or confidentiality of the IPsec flow.
5.4.3 Performance benefits of spreading to protect IPsec devices
The benefit of address spreading in cooperation with IPsec has been tested in labora-
tory. On the LAN test bed, a simulated attacker spoofs many IPsec packets, with a
fixed rate. The IP source address of packets sent by the attacker was always forged,
taking the IP address of a legitimate tunnel. Two kinds of attack tests were conducted:
with or without a valid SPI of the established IPsec tunnel.
The legitimate tunnel was sending a constant data flow, taking all the available
bandwidth between the firewall and the IPsec receiver, on a 100 Mb/s link. The
firewall was connected to a simulated Internet with a bandwidth of 1Gb/s, allowing an
attacker to send many packets.
Table 5.3 summarizes the results. The limiting resource is here the bandwidth
between the firewall and the IPsec receiver. Even without any knowledge of the SPI,
the attacker can inject traffic on this link and reduce the available bandwidth. As a side
effect, it reduces the CPU consumption on the IPsec receiver: the rejecting of forged
IPsec packets is faster than an decryption of real packets.
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With the knowledge of the SPI, the attack could be more efficient. It takes both
bandwidth and CPU resources on the IPsec receiver. With a faster network, the CPU
could be the limiting resource.
Without any knowledge of the SPI for attackers, address spreading protects against
bandwidth saturation. Knowing the SPI, an attacker can overload the CPU. In that
case, address spreading provides a very efficient protection to discriminate real packets
for a low CPU cost on the firewall.
The spreading is here very efficient to protect the IPsec receiver: all the packets are
dropped by the upstream firewall, protecting both CPU and bandwidth of the IPsec
receiver.
5.5 Conclusion: performance of the spreading
As expected with our theoretical work, address spreading without forward or back-
ward overlapping temporal windows reduces performance. Some packets are rejected
due to network latency and to device desynchronization. It leads to a false positive
detection: packets should be accepted. To evaluate the performance consequences on
real data transfers, the impact of this loss was tested with the popular TCP protocol.
Performance is heavily reduced in case of high frequency switching.
However, we propose to use overlapping temporal windows to avoid this drawback.
In this mode, the spreader can be listening on several addresses on the same time. It
complexifies the identification by the spreader (the looking for a valid state is more
complicated), but fully restores the network performances. With temporal windows
larger than the latency and larger than the acceptable time desynchronization, packet
loss falls to zero, even with high frequency switching.
This high frequency address spreading protects networks against spoofing, since the
attacker cannot guess the next address in use. Any reduction of the address lifetime
and of the temporal windows’ duration will improve the security, reducing the replay
attack risk.
In the same performance spirit, the use of overlapping temporal windows has a
second advantage: they can be used to detect devices’ desynchronization and to auto-
matically fix the gap between both clocks. For a small desynchronization, it is more
efficient than synchronization through a NTP daemon. The only condition is, of course,
a running traffic between both spreaders. An exchange of dummy packets when the
traffic is too low could be considered.
The last part of the chapter proposes a first evaluation of the use of address spread-
ing to protect an IPsec device. Results show a real improvement of performances,
without reducing the end-to-end security of the tunnel. This solution looks promising
to deploy a global secure architecture.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis focused on IPv6 headers, and more specifically on identifiers of their headers,
called addresses. My main interest was to imagine what could be done with the large
IPv6 address space? What properties can be added to improve security and privacy?
I proposed two answers to this question. The first is the introduction of ephemeral
addresses, protecting the correlation between flows and user activities. They do not
protect against powerful attackers, but still provide some privacy at the network layer.
It prevents the easy linking between IP addresses in use and all user’s web surfing
(Online Banking, casino, newspapers, political blogs, inspiration for marriage proposal,
search on health trouble. . . ), a linking that is very valuable for some companies, but
not really for the user.
My second answer is the introduction of address spreading. It further develops the
concept of ephemeral addresses when cooperation is possible between communication
partners. The advanatge being that addresses do not have to be valid over a connection
lifetime, and can be changed at a very high frequency. I named it address spreading,
taking the “spread-spectrum” terminology used in wireless communication. At the IP
level, address spreading defines a new paradigm to identify flows.
In this conclusion, I will first describe the main advantages, drawbacks, and outlooks
for the ephemeral addresses. Since ephemeral addresses need a signalization through
flow labels, I will explain the challenges for the flow label management in the future. I
will close this thesis with a description new research topics opened by address spreading,
which could provide real benefits for Internet security.
Ephemeral addresses
I defined ephemeral address as an identifier for an unique flow, with a very short validity.
Designed to protect user’s privacy, their lifetime is no longer than the transmission
duration. It is the shortest validity duration to avoid connection cut and this short
lifetime implies the use of many addresses. This address consumption was of course
not realistic with IPv4, because of the well known IPv4 address exhaustion problem,
but this thesis proves the feasibility of deploying such a solution on the IPv6 Internet.
In the next paragraph, I will summarize the advantages of ephemeral addresses. I
will explain then the main drawbacks of my solution, and the difficulties to deploy it
on a very large scale. I will close the section with a proposition of further research to
solve this issue, allowing a large scale deployment and better privacy protection.
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Advantages and deployment of ephemeral addresses
On initial examination of IPv4 NATP and the ephemeral addresses they look alike.
Both solutions are rewriting internal addresses, to external ones. Both impact privacy:
real IP addresses are obfuscated. An external observer cannot find the IP address in
use, and precisely identify a computer user behind the rewriting device.
However, the similarity ends here. The address space size redefinition between both
versions of the IP protocol made a fundamental change, allowing the emergence of
protocols based on new basics. The principle of ephemeral addresses is laid on IPv6
headers only, and no other protocol identifiers. The bijectivity of the flow transfor-
mation function F is easy to provide, thanks to the 64 (at least) available bits of the
interface identifier.
The manipulation of IPv6 headers alone has many advantages. First, it simpli-
fies the packet parsing, improving the performance of rewriting. Second, it improves
rewriting compatibility with software applications. If this compatibility is still an is-
sue, a solution can be provided to disable the ephemeral address rewriting for specific
protocols or flows.
This disabling of ephemeral addresses is based on the same signalization as the
flow categorization: flow labels, which are specific of IPv6 headers. The assignment of
flow labels by end devices allows one to find group connections that belong to a same
application flow. This grouping is much more efficient than an en-route packet parsing,
and maintains the intelligence at the network borders, not in the network. With this
solution, the application itself can choose to allocate ephemeral addresses, providing
the best possible compartment of packets.
Of course, the use of ephemeral addresses cannot be compared with full featured
solutions like the AN.ON project of the Tor network. It does not provide any real
anonymity, and a powerful attacker can still identify the user behind an ephemeral
address. The user has to choose between a powerful solution, at a high cost, or this
lightweight protection for daily use.
One key of the protection benefit of ephemeral addresses is the number of users
behind the middlebox. Of course, this information is not always known by attackers,
but an unique user behind a middlebox is not really protected. Someone having this
information knows that all outgoing flows of the middlebox are owned by this user.
To provide a large group of users, middleboxes can be cascaded. One example of
this kind of cascade could be a middlebox at the home router place, providing a group
composed of all residents of that home. A second middlebox can be provided by the
ISP, at the network borders connected to other Autonomous Systems (ASs). With
this architecture, the ISP cannot extract with a traffic analysis more information than
already available for connectivity purpose (this IPv6 prefix is assigned to this customer,
at this address), and the user privacy is protected outside the ISP network. It does not
break the eventual legal requirements, the rewriting can be logged on both devices.
The stateful drawback
However, the large scaling of middleboxes is limited. The flow transformation is stateful,
each couple (IPint, label) is stored and linked to an external address IPext. The states
protect against collisions, and provide an easy way to cache values like the checksum
modification, and allow to fully randomize interface identifiers. In other words, states
are the proof of the bijectivity of F . An external address is linked to one and only one
internal address.
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This stateful solution has two drawbacks. The first one the status of single points
of failure for middleboxes. A middlebox outage will reset all the states, and therefore
will break all established connections. The second issue is the difficulty to synchronizes
states between several output points on a large network, such an ISP. States have to
be synchronized between all routers in order to safeguard the bijectivity of F . It is not
acceptable that F (IPint, label) return an IP address IPa on a first output point, and
IPb on a second one.
To a stateless rewriting of addresses?
To solve this issue, a future work is to find a stateless function F , defined as follows:
F (IPint, label, secret) = IPext
The F function takes as argument the same pair (IPint, label) as the middlebox
proposed in chapter 2, and a new secret argument. This argument is shared between
all middleboxes of an ISP, and protects the F function against attackers. The goal is
to prevent attackers from guessing the IPint address with the IPext information.
Since the F function has to be stateless, the reverse function F−1 is harder to define.
It has to be a function taking only the external part of the identifier (here, only the
IPdst value) and the secret, to provide a mapping to the internal network:
F−1(IPdst, secret) = IPint
One example of functions providing a mapping between internal and external values,
protected by a secret, is given by the encryption functions. The main difficulty here is
the small size of data to encrypt, if a 64 bits size is assumed for the interface identifier.
There is a collision risk for outputs (breaking the bijectivity of F ), and a security risk
that someone observing the external traffic guesses the secret.
Such a definition of a stateless and secure function F has many advantages: a
possibly wide deployment, and a simplification of the mapping logging. The storage of
each mapping is not useful anymore, because the secret value is enough to rebuild an
identification.
Outlooks of flow label management
One of the key features of ephemeral addresses is the signalization between end devices
and middleboxes, through flow labels. In my practical evaluation, I experienced the
problem of flow label assignment and of the communication between operating systems
and software.
The lack of a standard API explained in chapter 4 is an important issue for deploying
flow labels. All protocols defined by engineers and researchers, and using flow labels
have the same problem: it cannot work without any end device cooperation.
The overview of the flow label manager implementation on several operating system
is a first steps to providing compatibility, with a multi-platforms library. Such a library
could help developers to set and use flow labels, to build innovative applications based
on IPv6.
However, such a library is not even a long term solution without any work at the
IETF or other standardization organization to provide a standard. Even for Quality
of service (QoS) purposes, applications have to cooperate with operating systems to
assign labels. An extension of the IPv6 socket API is mandatory.
90 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
Even though this standardization process is not a current topic, the relevance of
this question is proved by the evolution of the features provided by some of the main
operating systems. In the last changes, there are of course some security fixes, like
forbidding the use of incremental values to set a label, broadcasting the number of
connections used on a computer. In the same time, flow label support is being improved
on some operating systems, such as the MAC OS one and the Linux Kernel. After
my work to fix the flow label implementation and provide new feature on the Linux
Kernel, a new functionality has been added by a Google developer to support the
IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL option, like in the BSD systems. It could become a de facto
standard, if the standardization process does not provide an alternative.
Address spreading: a new research topic
The most important contribution of this thesis has been to define and test address
spreading. I defined a new clock based identification paradigm, on the top of IPv6.
It provides a more secure identification, since an attacker is unable to guess to next
address in use, and cannot insert packets in the network protected by spreaders. The
solution does not use any external header, preserving the network performance and
reducing the risk of packet dropping by an intermediate node that would not recognize
the additional headers. Furthermore, it does not need any upgrade of intermediate
routers and the solution is fully compatible with the current Internet.
In this section, I will summarize the theoretical proposition and my experimental
results. I will describe in another paragraph the most important remaining issues, that
I have not had the time to solve. I will close this thesis with some applications for the
address spreading, with innovative use cases and propositions to take advantage of all
the solution.
Results of this thesis
Theoretical propositions
Address spreading is the first attempt to transform a flow relying on a function:
F (packet, time)
that returns an address temporal sequence. I described in chapter 3 the details of an
initialization protocol, providing a separation of each unique flow to an unique sequence.
As for ephemeral addresses, the use of the flow label field allows a more granular flow
identification, inside a trusted network.
I analyzed the risk of false positive detection. With address spreading, a new metric
is inserted: the time. The time is a difficult concept on computers, and more specifically
on the Internet. Indeed, all communications take time to be transmitted, which is called
latency. This latency depends on the route taken by packets, on the current congestion,
and can fluctuate anytime. With address spreading, some packets can be rejected due
to this latency, because they come to late for a valid identification on the destination
spreader.
I proposed to add overlapping temporal windows, to accept simultaneously the
current address computed fo the current time and the address previously in use:
F (packet, time), F (packet, time− 1)
If this temporal window is larger than the latency, it protects against packet rejection.
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Since two computers cannot be perfectly synchronized, I added a second overlapping
temporal window for the future address in use. For a short duration, the spreader will
accept both F (packet, time) and F (packet, time+ 1). This window has two functions.
First, it prevents rejecting packets because of time desynchronization. Second, it allows
for the detection of desynchronization, and to automatically resynchronize devices.
Tests and performance evaluation
I completed the theoretical work on address spreading by an evaluation of performances
and tests on the Internet in chapter 5. My implementation is based on the Linux
Kernel, and the packet processing follows the steps described in the theoretical part of
the thesis. I had two test beds, one in a laboratory, and one across the Internet and a
low quality 6to4 tunnel.
This evaluation is the first real evaluation of a clock based protocol on IPv6 net-
works. For example, the MT6D proposition [DGU+11] does not provide performance
tests on the Internet, and the Shim6 privacy extension [BGMA07] has never been im-
plemented.
Tests were consistent with the theoretical evaluation, and the introduction of over-
lapping windows is very efficient to protect against false positive detection. Even across
a low quality network, the address spreading was able to provide a high frequency
switching of addresses, with negligible impacts on network performance.
Most important remaining issues
However, this promising work opens some issues. The first one remains time fluctu-
ation. The overlapping temporal windows solved false positive detection, inside an
acceptable fluctuation value, but not more. The second issue is the secret exchange
between spreaders, which is out of the scope of this thesis. Without this exchange, the
architecture is not fully described.
Time synchronization and latency
The Internet traditionally does not provide any kind of performance warranty. Each
packet is independent, and a packet can be much faster than the next one in a flow.
This variation is a problem for a clock based identification: a packet slower than the
configured allowance will be rejected. However, this problem is often restricted. Inter-
net network connectivity is improved each year , and the fluctuation are often included
within a range, as proven by the tests on 6to4.
The problem becomes more critical for a brutal and fast variation of the latency,
often due to a route change because of a device failure. For example, figure 6.1 depicts
the measured latency between a server connected by the French hoster OVH and a
server connected through the hoster Gandi. Frequently large fluctuations and some
anomalies over a large period of time have been observed.
This fluctuation has to be further analyzed. An evaluation on the PlanetLab net-
work [CCR+03] was planned, but at the time of the thesis writing, IPv6 was unfortu-
nately not supported.
The second desynchronization issue is a brutal reconfiguration of the spreader clock.
Spreaders are able to detect and to correct a clock desynchronization, but it is a symp-
tom of a bigger issue. If clock desynchronization becomes too high, a manual reconfigu-
ration will probably occur in the future, breaking the adjustment computed for address
spreading.
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Figure 6.1: Latency between OVH and Gandi IPv6 networks.
For both issues, further analysis are mandatory to evaluate the impact of the prob-
lem, and to optimize spreader configurations.
Exchange of the secret
Another issue raised by address spreading is the need of a secret shared by spreaders,
exchanged before the first connection. It makes an auto-configuration harder, and
harder to deploy for administrators. Fortunately, the exchange of secrets is a common
problem on the Internet. Good solutions already exist, and the address spreading does
not have to invent a new one. However, an evaluation of them in the address spreading
context is needed.
Extend address spreading to more use cases
Since address spreading consumes very few resources, it could be deployed on many
networks. For example, it could be relevant to deploy this identification paradigm in
Smartgrids [GXL+12], or in RPL networks [WTB+12].
Furthermore, the use case variety could be increased with small improvements of
the solution. I present some of them in this thesis ending.
Multihoming
Multihoming is an interesting extension field for address spreading. Indeed, since the
identification process is enhanced by the address sequence, spreaders can easily be mul-
tihoming aware: the most important part of the identification is the interface identifier,
not the prefix.
A first approach to enable multihoming will be to add a configuration option on
spreaders, to set several prefixes for the destination network.
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Figure 6.2: Current architecture of address spreading protection.
Patched last routers – end-to-end security
The best place to enable spreading is discussed in the chapter 3. One proposition is
to add a patched router, receiving a partial information on the secret to follow the
relevant part of the sequence for packet transmission. A solution has to consider a
way to give partial information to the router: enough to follow the mapping between
IP destination addresses received from the Internet and the local MAC address, but
without the capacity to build a flow (the key to generate the second address involved
in the spreading is still secure).
The security of the information transfer is not the only issue. A performance eval-
uation is needed as well.
Integration with firewalls
With a secure way to transfer partial information from spreaders to other devices, it
becomes possible to build a better integration with firewalls. In the current architecture
of address spreading, a stateful firewall can only be placed in local networks, behind
spreaders. It does not make sense to try to filter spread packets, with a paradigm based
on static flows. This figure 6.2 depicts the current architecture. With this solution,
spoofed packets still consume resources on the path between attackers and spreaders.
In the future, it could be very interesting to send partial information to upstream
firewalls, allowing a partial filtering as soon as possible. Figure 6.3 depicts this propo-
sition. With this architecture, packets coming from the Internet will first be analyzed
by upstream firewalls, and partially filtered. Second, spreaders will reject all of them
which do not exactly follow the spreading. Lastly, a standard router can filter packets
thanks to the traditional policy. This firewall is useful to apply the traditional filtering
policy between networks A and the B.
94 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
Figure 6.3: Address spreading protection with synchronized upstream routers.
IPsec extension
Another promising research topic is the combination between IPsec and address spread-
ing. First experimental results in chapter 5 have shown that it can provide additional
security, and protect devices against spoofed packets. Without the spreading, an at-
tacker can consume a lot of resources on IPsec devices, taking resources to invalidate
packets.
A very good synergy could be built: thanks to IPSec and the IKEv2 protocol, we
could add an extension to generate a secret between both devices. This secret could
then be used to generate address sequences.
One last advantage of this solution with IPSec is to allow the transmission of the
secret used to generate the sequence to an upstream firewall, and not only partial
information as described above. The firewall is then able to quickly discriminate packets
on the communication path, adding a protection against denial of service and spoofed
packets. The end-to-end security remains, the IPSec packet is protected thanks to other
secrets to provide confidentiality and integrity.
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Appendix A
Some discussions on IPv6
specifications
A.1 The real size of IPv6 prefixes
An IPv6 address is divided in two parts: the routing prefix and the interface identifier.
IPv6 specifications define no default or static size for the routing prefix. As a conse-
quence, IPv6 routing is done on variable prefix lengths, without any assumption on the
length. Network nodes receive information on the size thanks to router advertisements.
The size can, however, change at any time.
In practice, a large number of networks use a standard size of 64 bits. This is not
surprising, given that it is the minimum size imposed by several interface identifier gen-
eration mechanisms (CGA [Aur05] used to secure the local network, EUI-64 addresses
[HD06], HBA [Bag09] used to secure Shim6 [NB09] protocol, . . . ). These algorithms
could use larger sizes without any problem, since the excess bits can be set to zero or
a random value.
A draft is currently in discussion at the IETF [BTF+14], giving the state of the art
for sizing these prefixes and the consequences not to use the “usual” size of 64 bits. No
rules have been set so far to restrict it to 64 bits, but with the exception of some very
specific networks, a minimum size of 64 bits for interface identifiers can be assumed.
A.2 Are some bits of interface identifier significant?
At the beginning of the IPv6 specification process, some bits of the interface identifier
have been reserved fo setting specific informations. According to the RFC of IPv6
architecture [HD06], the second bit (the “u” bit) could be set to announce an “universal”
address, for example when this identifier derives from an unique hardware identifier.
If all end devices had followed this rule, and if hardware providers have respected the
uniqueness of hardware identifiers, one would have been sure that an IPv6 interface
identifier with the bit “u” were unique. If the node was aware of a collision risk for
the interface identifier generation process, generation algorithms would have set the
bit to zero. Applying this rule, a generated address would not have interacted with
the “unique” address space, even if the generation were fully random, like with privacy
extension [NDK07].
According to the same RFC, a second special bit could be set according to the
information available in the MAC address: the “i/g” bit. For a MAC address, this bit
would indicate a link-layer multicast.
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Both special bits are today not really used. For the “u” bit, the hardware identifier
uniqueness is actually not respected by hardware providers. There is today no warranty
of uniqueness in the address space with the “u” bit set. In the same way, the “i/g” bit
is often set without signaling a link-layer multicast.
Since the bits were not set according to the previous rules, the RFC 7136 [CJ14]
has removed the special states of these bits, and they can now be considered as opaque
values. Nevertheless, since the RFC 7136 has not updated previous specifications, some
algorithms of interface identifier still set these bits according to them. This does not
have any implication for future algorithms: it is allowed to arbitrary set the “u” and
the “g” bit on a network.
Appendix B
Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AH Authentication Header
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
AS Autonomous System
CGA Cryptographically Generated Addresses
CT Context Tag
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DNS Domain Name System
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HBA Hash Based Addresses
HIP Host Identity Protocol
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
IP Internet Protocol
ISP Internet Service Provider
KDF Key derivation function
LISP Locator/ID Separation Protocol
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MAC Media Access Control
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching
MPTCP Multipath TCP
MTU Max Transport Unit
NATP Network Address Port Translation
NAT Network Address Translation
NDP Neighbor Discovery Protocol
NPTv6 Network Prefix Translation
NSAP Network Service Access Point
NSA National Security Agency
NTP Network Time Protocol
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PA Provider-Assigned
PI Provider-Independent
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PPP Point-to-Point Protocol
QoS Quality of service
RA Router Advertisements
RSVP Resource Reservation Protocol
RS Router Solicitation
RTT round-trip delay time
SAP Service Access Point
SCTP Stream Control Transmission Protocol
SEND Secure Neighbor Discovery
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SLAAC Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
SPI Security Parameters Index
STUN Simple Traversal of UDP through NATs
Shim6 Site Multihoming by IPv6 Intermediation
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
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UDP User Datagram Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
VoIP Voice over IP
XMPP Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
